1 The difference between participation and negotiation, and many other thought-provoking messages, are taken from: Both ENDS and Gomukh. (2005). River Basin Management: A Negotiated Approach. Amsterdam: Both ENDS; and Pune: Gomukh. Personal communication with Danielle Hirsch (Both ENDS) has also been appreciated.

2 Mehta, L., Leach, M., Newell, P., Scoones, I., Sivaramakrishnan, K. and Way, S.-A. (1999). Exploring understandings of institutions and uncertainty: new directions in natural resource management. IDS Discussion Paper 372. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex.

3 Rogers, P. and Hall, A.W. (2003). Effective Water Governance. Technical Advisory Committee Background Paper #7. Stockholm: Global Water Partnership (GWP) Secretariat.

4 WCD. (2000). Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision Making. Cape Town: World Commission on Dams.

5 See also Scanlon, J., Cassar, A. and Nemes, N. (2004). Water as a Human Right? Environmental Policy and Law Paper No. 51. Gland and Cambridge: IUCN. Examples of international rights declarations:

6 CESCR. (2002). “General Comment #15 about the Right to Water”. Proceedings of the 29th Session 11–29 November 2002. Geneva: Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

7 UNECE. (1998). “Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters”. Geneva: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.

8 Raiffa, H. (1982). The Art and Science of Negotiation. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

9 Ibid.

10 Based on IAP2 (2007). “Spectrum of Public Participation”. Thornton CO: International Association for Public Participation.

11 Decades of conflict over wastewater management were only resolved once a government was elected that was more open to engagement with local stakeholders. See NEGOTIATE case study on the IUCN Water website: Learning to listen – government openness to work with community members resolves decades of conflict over wastewater treatment in Coffs Harbour, Australia by Pam Allan.

12 Fisher, R., Ury, W. and Patton, B. (1992). Getting to Yes: Negotiating an Agreement without Giving In. 2nd edition. London: Arrow Business Books.

13 See Lewicki, R., Barry, B., Saunders, D. and Minton, J. (2003). Negotiation. 4th edition. New York NY: Irwin/McGraw-Hill, for numerous examples of competitive negotiating tactics.

14 See NEGOTIATE case study on the IUCN Water website: The Challenge of International Watercourse Negotiations in the Aral Sea Basin by Richard Kyle Paisley.

15 Wertheim, E., Love, A., Peck, C. and Littlefield, L. (2006). Skills for Resolving Conflict. Second Edition. Cowes VIC: Eruditions Publishing.

16 See for example, Emerton, L. and Bos, E. (Eds) (2004). VALUE – Counting Ecosystems as Water Infrastructure. Gland: IUCN. VALUE describes how different types of economic and ecosystem values can be linked. If the relationships between ecosystems, water demand and supply can then be given consideration and ‘integrated’ into water management decision making, this can lead to new incentives, investment opportunities and value chains that incorporate ecosystem values. This opens new pathways for increasing the sustainability of agreements and of global development goals.

17 See NEGOTIATE case study on the IUCN Water website: How the Weak Prevailed – Nepali Activists Engage the World Bank over Arun-3 and From “No Dams!” to “No Bad Dams!” Nepal's Engagement with the World Commission on Dams by Dipak Gyawali.

18 For details on the process, lessons and outcomes of the review, see NEGOTIATE case study on the IUCN Water website: Ok Tedi and Fly River negotiation over compensation: using the mutual gains approach in multi-party negotiations by Barbara Sharp and Tim Offor.

19 The figure guiding the chapter uses earlier work on MSPs (see Dore, J. (2007). “Mekong Region water-related MSPs: Unfulfilled potential”. In: Warner, J. (Ed.) Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Water Management, 205–234. Aldershot: Ashgate); and relates it to outcome mapping by Earl, S., Carden, F. and Smutylo, T. (2001). Outcome Mapping: Building Learning and Reflection into Development Programs. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre; and re-presentation of this mapping by Ricardo Wilson-Grau (unpublished). This latter conceptualization introduces ‘spheres of control’ that are useful to keep in mind when considering the possibilities and limitations of MSPs. The core of this outcome mapping approach is the focus on the importance of changing the social behaviour of actors. Context is only partially within the control of the MSP, as context is partly inherited. Process, content and outcomes are within the control of the MSP and its participants. Impact (higher-order than outcomes) is usually dependent on changing the behaviour of actors beyond the MSP participants.

20 See IIED and WBCSD. (2002). “Ok Tedi Riverine Disposal Case Study (Appendix H)”.In: Mining for the Future. London and Conches-Geneva: International Institute for Environment and Development and World Business Council for Sustainable Development; and NEGOTIATE case study on the IUCN Water website: Ok Tedi and Fly River negotiation over compensation: using the mutual gains approach in multi-party negotiations by Barbara Sharp and Tim Offor.

21 For a summary of a Mekong MSP see IUCN, TEI, IWMI and M-POWER. (2007). Exploring Water Futures Together: Mekong Region Waters Dialogue. Report from Regional Dialogue, Vientiane, Lao PDR. IUCN, Thailand Environment Institute, International Water Management Institute and Mekong Program on Water Environment and Resilience. At

22 The section on scales and levels is adapted from Dore, J. and Lebel, L. (2009). “Deliberation, scales, levels and the governance of water resources in the Mekong Region”. M-POWER Working Paper, Chiang Mai University, who drew on earlier work of Lebel; and that of Gibson, C., Ostrom, E. and Ahn, T.K. (2000). “The concept of scale and the human dimensions of global change: a survey”. Ecological Economics 32: 217–239; and Sneddon, C., Harris, L. and Dimitrov, R. (2002). “Contested waters, conflict, scale and sustainability in aquatic socio-ecological systems”. Society and Natural Resources 15: 663–675.

23 Dore and Lebel, ibid.

24 A case on an MSP for a water and sanitation project in Bolivia illustrates the importance of timing to enable MSP recommendations to be acted upon (see A Multi-Stakeholder Platform to solve a conflict over a Water and Sanitation Project in Tiquipaya, Bolivia by Vladimir Cossio on the IUCN Water website

25 This quote is taken from from Watson, N. (2007). “Collaborative capital: a key to the successful practice of integrated water resources management” (in Warner (2007)), from which Case 3.6 about the Fraser Basin Council is derived. More background information can be found at

26 Miller, J.D.B. (1962). The Nature of Politics. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

27 Hay, C. (1997). “Divided by a common language: political theory and the concept of power”. Politics 17:1, 45–52. [CrossRef]

28 VeneKlasen, L. and Miller, V. (2002). A New Weave of Power, People and Politics: The Action Guide for Advocacy and Citizen Participation. Oklahoma City, OK: World Neighbours.

29 To the deliberative democrat, Dryzek, deliberation is ‘multifaceted interchange or contestation across discourses within the public sphere’ (see Dryzek, J.S. (2001). “Legitimacy and economy in deliberative democracy”. Political Theory 29(5): 651–669) where discourses are seen as ‘shared sets of assumptions and capabilities embedded in language that enables its adherents to assemble bits of sensory information that come their way into coherent wholes’ (Dryzek, J.S. (1999). “Transnational democracy”. The Journal of Political Philosophy 7(1): 30–51, at 34). MSPs provide a mechanism for such ‘contestation across discourses’. In so doing, they are in accord with the social learning perspective, the ‘building blocks’ of which are: the constructivist paradigm, an orientation towards reflection and action, and commitment to a holistic approach, see Maarleveld, M. and Dangbegnon, C. (2002). “Social learning: major concepts and issues”. In: Leeuwis, C. and Pyburn, R. (Eds) Wheelbarrows Full of Frogs. Assen: Koninklijke Van Gorcum. Just as MSPs are diverse in their purpose and emphasis, so too is the ‘broad church’ of constructivism which ‘both seeks and serves to restore politics and agency to a world often constituted in such a way as to render it fixed and unyielding’ (Hay, C. (2002). Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave). So it can be seen that the deliberative democrats, the social learning school, and constructivists, have much in common. Each emphasize the role of ideas as significant in reshaping the world.

30 Wageningen International in the Netherlands maintains a very helpful MSP portal which includes excellent information about techniques, but also a regularly updated compilation of experiences from around the world.

31 The figure is adapted from Vermeulen, S., Woodhill, J., Proctor, F.J. and Delnoye, R. (2008). Chain-wide learning for inclusive agrifood market development: a guide to multi-stakeholder processes for linking small-scale producers with modern markets. International Institute for Environment and Development, London UK, and Wageningen University and Research Centre, Wageningen, The Netherlands, 111. The figure is taken from page 57.

32 The text on setting up, stakeholder analysis and scenarios draws heavily on Dore, J., Woodhill, J., Keating, C. and Ellis, K. (2000). Sustainable Regional Development Kit: A resource for improving the community, economy and environment of your region. Yarralumla ACT: Greening Australia [Resource book + CD].

33 See NEGOTIATE case study about Umatilla ground water on the IUCN Water website.

34 See NEGOTIATE case study about Komadugu Yobe Basin on IUCN Water website.

35 See Warner, J. (Ed.) (2007). Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Water Management. Aldershot: Ashgate. This quote is taken from the preface to this highly relevant book which provides 16 chapters exploring water-related MSPs from all corners of the world.

36 The notion of the social contract for the participants is similar to the IAP2 ‘promise to the public’ (discussed in Chapter 2). An elaboration of this typology – looking at whether participants are invited to speak based primarily on their knowledge and skill (experts?), or based on their capacity to commit (authority?) or significantly influence the commitment of a constituency – can be found in Susskind, L.E., Fuller, B., Ferenz, M. and Fairman, D. (2003). “Multistakeholder Dialogue at the Global Scale”. International Negotiation 8: 235–266. [CrossRef]


38 See NEGOTIATE case study on the IUCN Water website: Interlinking of Rivers in India: Dialogue and Negotiations by National Civil Society Committee by Biksham Gujja; and Alagh, Y.K., Pangare, G. and Gujja, B. (Eds) (2006). Interlinking of Rivers in India. New Delhi: Academic Foundation, in collaboration with the National Civil Society Committee on Interlinking of Rivers in India (NCSCILR).

39 See NEGOTIATE case study on the IUCN Water website: Visioning on the future of the rivers Scheldt and Waal by Jeroen Warner.

40 See NEGOTIATE case studies on the IUCN Water website: Sharing Irrigation Water in Bhutan: Companion Modeling for Conflict Resolution and Institution Building by Gurung et al.; and Using Companion Modeling to level the playing field and influence more equitable water allocation in northern Thailand by Barnaud et al. See also Building Shared Understanding – Use of role-playing games and simulations to negotiate improved water management in the Republic of Kiribati by Natalie Jones.

41 For the conceptual approach and detail of the MA scenarios, see Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. (2005b). Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Scenarios, Volume 2. Washington, DC: Island Press, with particular attention to Chap. 8 by Cork et al. Water and wetland findings and recommendations are synthesized in Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. (2005a). Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Wetlands and Water Synthesis. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute.

42 Dyson, M., Bergkamp, G. and Scanlon, J. (Eds) (2003). FLOW – The Essentials of Environmental Flows. Gland: IUCN; see also Smith, M., de Groot, D. and Bergkamp, G. (Eds) (2008). PAY – Establishing payments for watershed services. Gland: IUCN; and Sadoff, C., Greiber, T., Smith, M. and Bergkamp, G. (Eds) (2008). SHARE – Managing water across boundaries. Gland: IUCN. All available at SHARE provides a practical guide to water sharing across boundaries (or borders), with a focus on the 260 river and lake basins shared worldwide by two or more countries. It explores potential costs and benefits of cooperation, and of non-cooperation, and principles and mechanisms for incentive creation and benefit sharing. Transboundary negotations about water are an important issue between States. An infusion of deliberation, whether multi-stakeholder or not, would often improve the basis of negotiations and decision making. PAY provides ideas about payment systems that can be established to maintain or restore watershed services critical for downstream water users. When upstream services are valued, it provides an incentive for market systems to be explored as one way of encouraging land and water use that meets the needs of more than just upstream users.

43 For more information see the Senegal contribution to the 1st World Water Development Report (OMVS. (2003). “Chapter 20. Senegal River Basin, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal”. In: UNESCO-WWAP (Ed.) Water for People, Water for Life: The United Nations World Water Development Report, 1st Report, 450–461. Barcelona: Bergahn Books).

44 There was a huge knowledge base assembled and debated by the WCD platform which informed the final report of the Commissioners (WCD. (2000) Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision Making. Cape Town: World Commission on Dams). All reports, including details of the process, can be found online at Critiques abound, but any reviewer of this process should include Dubash, N.K., Dupar, M., Kothari, S. and Lissu, T. (2001). A Watershed in Global Governance? An Independent Assessment of the World Commission on Dams. World Resources Institute, Lokayan and Lawyer's Environmental Action Team.

45 Dixit, A., Adhikari, P. and Bisangkhe, S. (Eds) (2004). Constructive Dialogue on Dams and Development in Nepal. IUCN and Nepal Water Conservation Foundation.

46 In the words of one MSP research team: ‘If there is not a full recognition of interdependence by stakeholders, including water bureaucracies, and the need for concerted action, MSPs will remain paper tigers’ (Wester, P., Hoogesteger van Dijk, J. and Paters, H. (2007). “Multi-stakeholder platforms for surface and groundwater management in the Lerma-Chapala basin, Mexico”. In: Warner (2007), 151–164).

47 For a detailed explanation of the four criteria for measuring the results of public policy negotiations see Susskind, L. and Cruikshank, J. (1987). Breaking the Impasse: Consensual Approaches to Resolving Public Disputes. New York NY: Basic Books.

48 For a detailed discussion of how to create value in negotiations by trading across issues see Raiffa, H. (1982). The Art and Science of Negotiation: How to resolve conflicts and get the best out of bargaining. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

49 For a more detailed discussion see the NEGOTIATE case study on the IUCN Water website.

50 The Danube River Protection Convention (DRPC) was initially signed in 1994, and came into force in 1998. In 2007 the contracting parties include the States of Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Moldova, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. It aims to ensure that surface waters and ground water within the Danube River Basin are managed and used sustainably and equitably. The International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River (ICPDR) is the platform for the implementation of the DRPC. See

51 The report can be accessed at Although the merit of listing the Danube in this report can be debated, it does signal the need to address unresolved conflicts between different ideas of how the river should be used and developed.

52 The Danube Commission was established to supervise the implementation of the 1948 Convention regarding the Regime of Navigation on the Danube (known as the Belgrade Convention). The 11 member States are Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany, Hungary, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine. It has its origins in the Paris Conferences of 1856 and 1921 which established an international regime to safeguard free navigation on the Danube. It is recognized that the Convention needs to be updated to reflect present-day circumstances where there has been a change in the politics of the region, with new States and territories. See

53 Susskind, L.E. (1994). Environmental Diplomacy: negotiating more effective global agreements. New York NY: Oxford University Press.

54 See Susskind, L., McKearnan, S. and Thomas-Larmer, J. (1999). The Consensus-Building Handbook: a comprehensive guide to reaching agreement. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications; and Susskind, L.E. and Cruikshank,, J.L. (2006). Breaking Robert's Rules: The new way to run your meeting, build consensus and get results. New York NY: Oxford University Press, for a detailed definition of consensus.

55 Ibid.; and Susskind, L.E., Levy, P.F. and Thomas-Larmer, J. (2000). Negotiating Environmental Agreements: how to avoid escalating confrontation, needless costs, and unnecessary litigation. Washington DC: Island Press.

56 Derived from: Susskind, L., McKearnan, S. and Thomas-Larmer, J. (1999). The Consensus-Building Handbook: a comprehensive guide to reaching agreement. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications

57 This case study draws largely on private communications with B.W. Fuller and material from Fuller, B.W. (2005). “Trading Zones: Cooperating for water resource and ecosystem management when stakeholders have apparently irreconcilable differences”. Dissertation, Department of Urban Studies and Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and Boswell, M.R. (2005). “Everglades Restoration and the South Florida Ecosystem”. In: Scholz, J.T. and Stiftel, B. (Eds) Adaptive Governance and Water Conflict: New Institutions for Collaborative Planning, 89–99. Washington DC: Resources for the Future. For a more detailed discussion see the NEGOTIATE case study on the IUCN Water website.

58 Mekong River Commission, the implementing organization for the Mekong Agreement.

59 Radosevich. G.E. (2007). Private Communication.

60 Radosevich, G.E. (1995). “Mekong Agreement History and Commentary”, 29. Unofficial Report.

61 See the NEGOTIATE case study on the IUCN Water website: Using Structured Decision Making in Collaborative Planning Processes for Better Water Management: An Innovative Approach to Water Use Planning in British Columbia, Canada prepared by Lee Failing and Graham Long, Compass Resource Management.

62 This text box draws on private communications with Dr G.E. Radosevich; material from the case Mekong River Basin, Agreement & Commission (see NEGOTIATE case study on the IUCN Water website; and from an unofficial 1995 report Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin: Commentary & History, both prepared by George E. Radosevich.

63 For a detailed discussion of Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) see Fisher, R., Ury, W.L. and Patton, B. (1981). Getting to Yes: Negotiating agreement without giving in. New York NY: Penguin Books.

64 For more on this see Susskind et al., 2000, supra note 9.

65 See the NEGOTIATE case study on the IUCN Water website: Komadugu Yobe Basin: A case study of participatory water charter development for sustainable and equitable management of water resources prepared by D.K. Yawson, H.G. Ilallah and I.J. Goldface-Irokalibe.

66 At the time of writing, a change in government had delayed the Charter's entry into force as some of the top officials required to endorse and implement the agreement had been replaced. Nevertheless, it is hoped that these new leaders will support the Charter when they learn about the multi-stakeholder process through which it was created and the overwhelming support it garnered

67 The Social Learning Group. (2001). Learning to Manage Global Environmental Risks. Volume I: A Comparative History of Social Responses to Climate Change, Ozone Depletion, and Acid Rain. [Clark, W.C., Jäger, J., van Eijndhoven, J. and Dickson, N.M. (Eds)]. Cambridge MA: The MIT Press.

68 See NEGOTIATE case study on the IUCN Water website: Sharing Irrigation Water in Bhutan: Companion Modeling for Conflict Resolution and Promoting Collective Management by Tayan Raj Gurung, Francois Bousquet, Aita Kumar Bhujel, Gyenbo Dorji and Guy Trébuil.

69 See

70 See Case 4.1 in Chapter 4.

71 See NEGOTIATE case study on the IUCN Water website: Mekong River Basin Agreement and Commission by George E. Radosevich.



74 See NEGOTIATE case study on the IUCN Water website: Community-Based Approaches to Conflict Management, Umatilla County Critical Groundwater Areas by Todd Jarvis.


76 See NEGOTIATE case study on the IUCN Water website: Komadugu Yobe Basin: A Case Study of Participatory Water Charter Development for Sustainable and Equitable Management of Water Resources by D.K. Yawson, H.G. Ilallah and I.J. Goldface-Irokalibe.

77 See NEGOTIATE case study on the IUCN Water website: Negotiation Processes in Institutionalising Grassroots Level Water Governance: Case of Self Employed Women's Association, Gujarat, INDIA by Smita Mishra Panda.

78 See NEGOTIATE case study on the IUCN Water website from WANI projects in Guatemala, Mexico and El Salvador.

79 A catchment in the South African context is equivalent to a river basin as well as part of a river basin. See NEGOTIATE case study on the IUCN Water website: Multi-stakeholder Platforms and Negotiation: The Case of Kat River Valley Catchment Management Forum by Eliab Simpungwe.

80 For more information see

81 A ‘mécanisme de concertation permanent pour le Système Aquifère du Sahara Septentrional’. See NEGOTIATE case study on the IUCN Water website by Kerstin Mechlem.


83 See For an excellent analysis, see Connell, D. (2007). Water Politics in the Murray-Darling Basin. Annandale NSW: Federation Press.

84 See case study prepared for a BothEnds publication, also on the IUCN Water website: Negotiating our way through Livelihoods and Ecosystems – The Bhima River Basin Experience by Vijay Paranjpye and Parineeta Dandekar (

85 See Case 5.3 for more details on the Code of Conduct.

86 Fisher, R., Ury W. and Patton B. (1992) Getting To Yes: Negotiating An Agreement Without Giving In. (2nd edition). Arrow Business Books, London.

87 Chambers, S. (2003). ‘Deliberative Democratic Theory’, Annual Review of Political Science 6, 307–326. [CrossRef]

88 Dryzek, JS. (2006). Deliberative Global Politics: Discourse and Democracy in a Divided World. Polity Press. Cambridge.

89 Rogers, P. and Hall AW. (2003). ‘Effective Water Governance’. Technical Advisory Committee Background Paper #7. Global Water Partnership (GWP) Secretariat. Stockholm.

90 Dovers, S. (2005). Environment and Sustainability Policy: Creation, Implementation, Evaluation. Federation Press, Sydney.

91 Moore, C. (2003). The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict. 3rd edition. San Francisco, Jossey-Bass.

92 Menkel-Meadow, C. (1984). ‘Toward another view of legal negotiation: the structure of problem solving’. UCLA Law Review 31: 754–842. Lax, D. and Sebenius, J. (1986). The Manager as Negotiator: Bargaining for Co-operation and Competitive Gain. The Free Press. New York.

93 Leeuwis,, C.. and Pyburn, R. (2002). ‘Social learning for rural resource management’ in Leeuwis, C. and Pyburn, R. (eds.). Wheelbarrows Full of Frogs. Koninklijke Van Gorcum, Assen, 11–24.

94 Roling, N. (2002). ‘Moving beyond the aggregation of individual preferences’ in Leeuwis, C. and Pyburn, R. (eds.). Wheelbarrows Full of Frogs. Koninklijke Van Gorcum, Assen.

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