4.1 EIA as the Start of a Social Bargaining Process: The Malampaya Deepwater Gas-to-Power Project

Jay L. Batongbacal, Esq.273


The Malampaya Deepwater Gas-to-Power Project won a UN Environmental Programme/International Chamber of Commerce World Summit Business Award for Sustainable Development Partnerships in 2002. The project pioneered the 'social acceptability' criteria under the Philippine environmental impact statement system in 1996, and serves as an important example of the challenges of environmental governance within a complex social environment. It also shows that an environmental impact assessment (EIA) process that involves extensive public participation may be seen as a form of social bargaining that can contribute to governance long after the regulatory approvals have been secured. Unlike traditional public participation, a social bargaining process places certain demands and creates expectations on the part of the participants, especially community stakeholders, and continues beyond the initial decisions to foster environmental management. Viewing the EIA as such a process enables an analysis that addresses issues such as consent ex post facto and the importance of ‘social sustainability’ in the concept of governance for sustainability.

4.1.1 Introduction

The Malampaya Deepwater Gas to Power Project (Malampaya) was the first commercial natural gas production project in the Philippines. Between 1998 and 2001, it was constructed under budget and ahead of schedule astride environmentally sensitive areas while pioneering the ‘social acceptability’ criteria of the Philippine environmental impact statement (EIS) system. In business circles, the project's implementation is considered a major success, having garnered a World Summit Business Award for Sustainable Development Partnerships from the United Nations Environment Programme and the International Chamber of Commerce at the World Conference on Environment and Development at Johannesburg in 2002.274 The experiences of the companies involved now circulate as case studies of how the petroleum industry can successfully operate in socially and environmentally sensitive environments, with special attention on the public consultation process.275 However, independent research into the experience of the local communities reveals important issues that were not adequately treated in published case studies and indicate ways forward in conceptualising public participation processes in environmental governance. One way is to view public participation as a social bargaining process that places different demands on and creates different expectations among the participants. This view points to different approaches to improving regulatory regimes that rely on processes such as environmental impact assessments (EIAs).

4.1.2 Description

In 1989, a large offshore natural gas reservoir was discovered northwest of the island-province of Palawan and became the keystone of the new Philippine natural gas market. The Malampaya project comprises nine undersea wells connected by an undersea manifold to a production platform mounted on a concrete gravity structure about 50 kilometres from the nearest shore. A 504-kilometre pipeline takes the gas through the coastal waters of the island provinces of Palawan and Mindoro Oriental to an onshore natural gas processing plant in Batangas province in southwestern Luzon. There the gas is processed for distribution to three combined-cycle-turbine power plants generating a total of 2,760 megawatts of electricity, equivalent to 18 percent of the country's total power-generating capacity in 2001.

Considering the huge investments involved (US$ 4.5 billion), the massive technical and logistical challenges, and the strict project implementation timeline of three and a half years, the project's proponents, Royal Dutch Shell and Occidental Petroleum (Shell-Oxy) could not afford any unexpected or uncontrollable delays. At the time, the most likely source of delay was public rejection of the project. In the early 1990s, the Philippine government closed or abandoned several high-profile projects at huge expense because of public protests. March 1996 was further marked by the Marcopper Mining Disaster, possibly the worst environmental disaster in the country.276 As a result, the Philippine Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) revised the procedures for its EIS system just as the Malampaya project was about to commence.

The most important modifications were the inclusion of ‘social acceptability’277 as a key criterion for issuing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC), the introduction of a project ‘scoping’ stage preparatory to the actual EIA, and extensive public participation opportunities throughout the process. The revised rules tied these requirements into the 1991 Local Government Code, which obliged any national project taking place in or affecting the environment of any local government unit to be subject to public consultations and to the endorsement of the local government unit.278 Thus, local endorsement became a pre-condition for the issuance of the ECC. This condition was consistent with the policy of local autonomy guaranteed by the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Acknowledging that any opposition or rejection by any of the affected communities could threaten the project, Shell-Oxy committed to undertake its EIA in accordance with the new guidelines, even though they took effect after the Malampaya EIA had commenced.

Shell-Oxy allocated 16 months beginning in November 1996 for compliance with the Philippine EIS system. The massive scale of the project required the participation of the local government units: 3 provinces, 2 cities, 14 municipalities, and scores of barangay (villages), which either hosted or were adjacent to the project's facilities. Beyond the vicinity of these was the site used to construct the massive concrete gravity structure of the production platform. The construction necessitated building a new dry dock in Agusuhin village in the province of Zambales, whose residents had to be relocated to make way for this facility.

In preparation for the EIA, the Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc. (PSFI), a foundation used by Shell for its charitable works in the Philippines, conducted informal meetings and community outreach interviews at the grassroots throughout the three provinces. In 1996, a consulting company was engaged to conduct the EIA. Aside from scientific and economic assessments, the EIA eventually also involved an extensive social assessment component involving seven scoping workshops, nine public consultations/validation sessions, five focus group discussions, three perception surveys, eight key informant interviews, and separate presentations to the sangguniang bayan and panlalawigan (municipal legislative councils and provincial legislative councils) of the local government units.279 The proponents also met separately with the local chief executives concerned, down to the municipal level, and conducted a public information, education, and communication (IEC) campaign through print and radio.

Royal Dutch Shell, the prime contractor at the time, asserts that the input of the communities did influence the project's design. The informal consultations conducted prior to the actual EIA led to the decision to locate the pipeline entirely offshore, even though it was three times more expensive, instead of routing it over land through the island of Mindoro,280 to avoid affecting the rich biodiversity in Mindoro.

Although the government did not specify any minimum standards for a procedure to be regarded as a valid consultation apart from indicative examples of proof for the purposes of the EIS system, the activities enumerated above could be seen as rather extensive. The scoping stage and validation consultations were the most pivotal, since they were the main opportunities for the public to be formally informed and to interact with the project proponents. For the scoping sessions, participants were invited to various venues, usually the municipal hall, for an orientation about the EIA process, and then given information on the proposed project. Participants included the officials of the local governments, representatives of locally active nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), civic groups, and church and other community leaders, but the sessions were open to anyone interested. Meeting participants usually broke into groups to discuss possible effects, issues, and concerns generated by the proposed project. The results of the discussions were then presented at a plenary session. The outcomes of the scoping workshops were synthesized and validated in a second series of workshops in the affected areas, at which the proponent also presented measures intended to address the concerns raised. The results of these activities form part of the EIS, which after submission was subjected to public hearings and a third round of consultations by the DENR.

The overwhelming response of the participants revolved around perceived risks to their livelihoods and the direct benefits they felt their communities should receive from the project. The process documentation from the scoping and consultation stages, included in the proponent's EIS, details requests for direct benefits in the form of livelihood assistance, social development and infrastructure projects, funds, and various activities that the participants felt should be due to their respective communities. These responses were made in view of the perceived possibility of disaster and the publicised expectations of natural gas revenues to the national government and the country in general, but not to the local communities directly.

Throughout the consultations, and probably to ensure that objections and issues were not left unanswered to escalate into more serious actions, Shell-Oxy's public engagement strategy was flexible and not constrained to the EIA scheduled events. However, despite the extensive activities scheduled, the scoping process was still unable to account for some stakeholders and issues. There were at least two documented instances in which local stakeholders not identified during the scoping stage emerged much later in the EIA process with concerns that had been overlooked. In Palawan, the Tagbanua indigenous peoples later objected because their ancestral waters were thought to be traversed by or adjacent to the pipeline, and a group of pearl farmers objected that their operations would be placed at risk by a pipeline leak. Even after the ECC had been issued and construction was underway, there were two more instances in Mindoro Oriental. NGOs complained that proper consultations had not been conducted, and fishers protested the pipe-laying for fear of its impending impact on their fishing grounds. In all cases, Shell-Oxy responded by holding additional consultations and meetings with the groups to address the concerns raised. In hindsight, even sceptical NGOs from both Palawan and Mindoro appreciated the responsiveness of Shell-Oxy to the emergence of new groups and issues throughout the process.

One major and potentially damaging issue was the issuance of the ECC without the prior approval of the Palawan Council for Sustainable Development (PCSD). The PCSD is a separate regulatory body, unique to Palawan, established for the management of Palawan's sensitive environment, which is regarded the country's last frontier because of its relative underdevelopment and rich biodiversity.281 Under a 1994 memorandum of agreement with the DENR, the prior approval and endorsement of the PCSD, as well as the prior endorsement of each of the local government units affected, was needed before an ECC could be issued. However, the ECC was issued in 1998 with only a certification from the Provincial Governor who was at the time also the chair of the PCSD. This endorsement did not bear the PCSD's name, nor that of other local government units in Palawan. Thus, when Shell-Oxy finally made a formal presentation to the PCSD in 1999, after construction was already underway, the lack of prior endorsements became a major local controversy that strained not only the province's relations with Shell-Oxy but also its relations with the national government. A significant exchange of position papers occurred between Shell-Oxy and the Palawan NGO community, which opposed the project because of Nigeria's negative experience with Shell. In the end, however, after a number of meetings and hearings and a review of its EIS and ECC, the PCSD approved the project. Despite their misgivings, the NGO community agreed to continue engaging the proponent by participating in the monitoring of the project's operations.

NGO participation in monitoring was formalised through the establishment of a Multi-Partite Monitoring Team (MMT) tasked with monitoring compliance with the terms and conditions of the ECC. It was composed of representatives of the national and local governments, provincial and municipal environment officers, NGOs, and community leaders. It had a two-tiered structure: each of the three provinces had its own provincial monitoring team, which in turn reported to an executive committee at the national level. In both cases, the composition was multi-sectoral. The sectoral monitoring teams maintained contact with counterparts at the municipal levels to carry out the MMT's monitoring functions.

Aside from requiring compliance with the regulatory parameters for environmental quality such as permissible emissions, the ECC also contained conditions beyond the scope of impact mitigation. For example, the proponent is required to develop and fund an information, education, and communication program to explain to stakeholders all of the project's environmental mitigation, health, and safety measures. The campaign was to be implemented by a trisectoral team comprised of the DENR, the proponent, and ‘a highly credible NGO’.282 Most significantly, the proponent must implement a social development program including a comprehensive human resource development program, and ‘gender-responsive livelihood projects, technical, vocational and entrepreneurial skills training programs, and sustainable livelihood projects’.283 This program was initially undertaken by the PSFI, but since 2006 was taken over by the Malampaya Foundation, Inc., a new foundation established and funded by all the consortium partners.284

In a recent publication of five case studies, the World Resources Institute (WRI) presented the Malampaya project as the only example in which free, prior, and informed consent of the communities was successfully integrated into the business decision making, with resulting benefits in terms of costs and sustainability.285 The case study focused on Sitio Agusuhin, where the concrete gravity structure was built, and the Province of Batangas, which hosts the gas processing plant and the three power plants. The report noted that the project's design went through significant changes due to interaction with local communities, and the proponents exerted considerable effort to establish and cultivate its relationships with the affected communities throughout the project's operations.286 WRI also noted that although the ECC does not require the proponent to maintain community satisfaction and consent to the project, the MMT mechanism is an important means by which the public is able to participate in monitoring the project’s operations and address any new concerns as they arise. This mechanism has indeed been tested several times since Malampaya began production.287

However, what the WRI report does not address is the fact that consent to the project could not be characterised as being entirely free nor unanimous among all the local government units involved, especially in the 'non-site' provinces. The difficulty with involving such a large number of communities is the greater improbability of consensus, considering the many different impacts, perspectives, expectations, and interests. In Palawan, not all of the affected local government units issued the prior written endorsements officially required, and PCSD’s consent came after a fait accompli when the project was already underway. Several municipalities in Oriental Mindoro withheld their endorsements, and a considerable number submitted ambiguous, qualified, and conditional endorsements, which indicate that they had not yet clearly consented to the project when the EIA was completed.288

4.1.3 Evaluation

People commonly see EIAs as scientific and methodological procedures to determine the probability of risks and impacts and identify appropriate means to mitigate adverse effects of an activity: EIAs are intended to aid planning and decision making. This conception is manifest in Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration,289 which links EIAs with national government decisions that affect the environment. However, in recent years attention has been called to the need to broaden the scope of the EIA process. Traditional EIA tools and methodologies emphasize the planning stage, concentrate on biophysical factors, and are ill-equipped to fully comprehend and balance the scope of factors that a society may deem relevant for making decisions. One of the most important categories of non-biophysical factors are social concerns, which straddle the economic, political, and cultural spheres and which can influence the process of decision making. The Akwé:Kon Voluntary Guidelines concretely manifest the need to deliberately and systematically address these factors in the case of biodiversity conservation.290 It is obvious that for ‘sustainable development’ and ‘sustainability’ to be achieved, activities must be not only capable of biophysical perpetuation, but also ‘socially sustainable’, that is, permitted and accepted by society to be continued indefinitely. Thus, social acceptability is a threshold criterion for sustainability, even prior to biophysical and economic considerations.

This calls attention to the need to inquire into the very conception of social acceptability in the context of governance and the relationships between the national government (and the polity it symbolizes) and local government units (and the local communities they represent). If society is viewed not as a monolithic and pyramidal social organisation, but rather as a fluid and dynamic network of institutions with varied degrees of autonomy at different levels, then consent (and social acceptability) must be produced not by hierarchy-based regulatory or administrative decision- making processes, but by processes of bargaining between competing social actors and institutions.291

The Malampaya case study is a vivid example of the social bargaining that can take place within and after an EIA exercise. What happened was essentially an informal risk – benefit assessment regarding the entry of the project into or near the community's perceived territory. The subject of bargaining was an acceptable trade-off for the perceived unwanted exposure to risks, and the intuitively unequal allocation of benefits. This social bargaining was complicated by the multi-stakeholder environment, which increased the difficulty of consensus in proportion to the number and diversity of stakeholder communities. Although the WRI study showcases Malampaya as a good case of free, prior, and informed consent with respect to ‘site’ communities in Zambales and Batangas that hosted the construction and landfall facilities, a different picture emerges with respect to the ‘non-site’ communities in Palawan and Mindoro Oriental where it is more difficult to characterize the outcome.

In Palawan, when the EIA was conducted, there was a jurisdictional conflict between the DENR and the PCSD over the implementation of the EIA regulations. In addition, there was still no clear guidance on the role and process of scoping and public consultations; in fact, the Malampaya EIA was the forerunner and testing ground for EIAs that followed. For example, when the PCSD called the proponent to account for its possession of an ECC without PCSD endorsement or approval, it was also stating that there was a shortcoming in the requirement for prior and informed consent due to the lack of the corresponding endorsements of the PCSD and all local government units affected.

Mindoro Oriental likewise may not have unanimously granted consent to the pipeline, which lies in the waters of 12 of its 15 municipalities. A few municipalities like Naujan and Bulalacao actually withheld consent by not issuing any endorsements of the project, while a considerable number of municipalities issued only qualified certifications indicating that although the proponent consulted them about the project, they had yet to issue any resolutions of approval or disapproval.292 The difficulty, however, is that the law is silent as to whether a pipeline passing through municipal waters gives rise to any legal obligation on the part of the pipeline’s owner, or entitlements on the part of the municipality.

Despite the legal ambiguities in both cases, the parties found the means to arrive at a modus vivendi through the the ECC requirement for provision of a social development program and participation in the MMT. These conditions became the basis for continuing engagement between the proponent and the local governments. The EIA process still resulted in stringent parameters that enabled Shell-Oxy to design the project in a way that minimised its operational environmental impact and address the environmental risks and safety concerns. The ECC framed a direct dialogue with the stakeholders around the themes of environmental compliance and social development assistance.

Mindoro Oriental was not originally regarded as an equal participant in the MMT because it was considered a non-site province; at first it was only entitled to a member in the executive committee and did not have its own provincial monitoring team. But its representatives argued that because Mindoro Oriental was adjacent to the pipeline, and because the pipeline was within the jurisdictional waters of the municipalities, Mindoro Otiental was entitled to equal footing with Palawan or Batangas. They argued that the project was an integrated whole and not compartmentalised into the production platform, pipeline, and gas plant. The proponent was eventually persuaded, and a separate provincial monitoring team for Mindoro Oriental was belatedly organised. The province continues to benefit from the project's social development programs.

Palawan has been most active in project monitoring through participation in the MMT, with the PCSD and the NGO representatives being especially vigilant. The proponent's social development programs have been pursued in earnest, particularly those related to the provision of health services for the poor.293 The MMT is currently struggling with how to properly monitor and determine compliance with the social development program condition under the ECC, since monitoring the success of livelihood projects and other social programs are not within the competence of most of the MMT's members. Thus, Palawan continues to seek accountability from the proponent implying that the consent secured, though possibly flawed initially, is nonetheless ratified for as long as the proponent fulfils its public commitments toward environmental safety and social development.

4.1.4 Conclusion

EIAs can become the basis for broader and more flexible mechanisms for social interaction. They can not only to establish conditions and standards for environmental monitoring, but also establish a social bargaining process between the proponent and the affected stakeholders. As indicated earlier, a flexible, continuing, and open-ended engagement is key to the social acceptability of Malampaya's operations. Through such engagement the proponent and stakeholders are able to continually make claims and negotiate settlements that influence environmental management options and decisions. Similar to a contract, the EIA established the terms and conditions, as well as the venue, for a modus vivendi about the continuing impact of the project and it operations on the adjacent communities, which regard it as a source of continuing risk as well as an entitlement for compensatory benefits. Aside from pioneering social acceptability, Malampaya also provides an example by which the EIA process can contribute beyond planning into long-term public engagement and environmental governance. It demonstrates a possible mechanism by which prior missteps and flaws in the regulatory process may be addressed and resolved while still protecting environmental conditions. Because of the MMT and the ECC conditions, the proponent is obliged to ensure its best performance and responsiveness to stakeholder concerns and issues. This is important especially in cases where projects are time- or cost-sensitive and stakeholders are so numerous and varied that they may not have all been involved at the same level, or according to expectations, throughout the decision-making process. Continuing social acceptability is essential to social sustainability, which is crucial for ensuring that environmental management is not limited to scientific or regulatory activities, but also evolves into a governance framework for sustainability that clearly supports and addresses social needs.


Asian Institute of Management and Synergos Institute. ‘Shell Malampaya’ Unpublished case study, (Asian Institute of Management; Synergos Institute: Makati City and New York, 2003).

Bovaird, T. ‘Public Governance: Balancing Stakeholder Power in a Network Society’ International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 71, No. 2, 2002, pp. 217–28. [CrossRef]

Cash, D., W. et al. ‘Scale and cross-scale dynamics: Governance and information in a multi-level world’ Ecology and Society Vol.1, No. 2, p. 8. available at www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss2/art8/, 2006 (Accessed 10 April 2008).

Castells, M. The Rise of the Network Society (Blackwell Publishing: Oxford, 2000).

Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Philippines. Environmental Compliance Certificate No. 9708-001-207c, 1998.

Department of Environment and Natural Resources. ‘DENR Administrative Order No. 96–37 Revising DENR Administrative Order No. 21, Series of 1992, to Further Strengthen the Implementation of the Environmental Impact Statement System’, 1996.

International Chamber of Commerce Shell Wins Major International Sustainable Development Award (Press Release, 30 August 2002) available at www.shell.com/home/content/ph-en/news_and_library/press_releases/2002/malampaya_award_0830.html, 2002 (Accessed 10 April 2008).

International Finance Corporation Stakeholder Engagement: A Good Practice Handbook for Companies Doing Business in Emerging Markets (International Finance Corporation: Washington DC, 2007).

Presidential Decree No. 1857, an Act Granting New Incentives to Petroleum Service Contractors, and for This Purpose Amending Certain Sections of Presidential Decree Numbered Eighty-Seven, As Amended. 1983/01/01 (Philippines).

Presidential Decree No. 87, Amending Presidential Decree No. 8 Issued on October 2, 1972, and Promulgating an Amended Act to Promote the Discovery and Production of Indigenous Petroleum and Appropriate Funds Therefore. 1972/12/31 (Philippines).

Republic Act No. 7160, an Act Providing for a Local Government Code of 1991. 5th Regular Session, 1991/10/10 (Philippines).

Republic Act No. 7611, an Act Adopting the Strategic Environmental Plan for Palawan, Creating the Administrative Machinery for Its Implementation, Converting the Palawan Integrated Area Development Project Office to Its Support Staff, Providing Funds. 1992/06/19 (Philippines).

Roco, F. and Agabin, K. Power From the Deep: The Malampaya Story 2 vols. Vol. 1. Makati City Philippines: Shell Philippines Exploration BV, 2005.

Sohn, J. (ed.) Development without Conflict: The Business Case for Community Consent. (World Resources Institute: Washington DC, 2007).

UNEP Division of Technology Industry and Economics Mrf Incidents: Marinduque (Marcopper Mine) - Tailings Dam Failure, Philippines, March 1996, United Nations Environment Program. Available at www.mineralresourcesforum.org/incidents/Marinduque/index.htm, 2002 (Accessed 10 April 2008).

United Nations, ‘Declaration on Environment and Development’, UN Doc.A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1. (31 I.L.M. 814, 1992).

Woodward-Clyde Inc. ‘Environmental Impact Statement, Malampaya Gas Project: Final Report Appendices F and G’, In: Quezon City. (DENR Environmental Management Bureau, 1997).

273 Jay L. Batongbacal is a JSD candidate at the Marine Environmental Law Institute, Dalhousie Law School, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Email: jbatongb@dal.ca. This case study is drawn from the author's JSD research. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance provided by the Pierre Elliot Trudeau Foundation, Montreal, Quebec, for the conduct of fieldwork for this research.

274 International Chamber of Commerce, Shell Wins Major International Sustainable Development Award ,Press Release (30 August 2002), available at www.shell.com/home/content/ph-en/news_and_library/press_releases/2002/malampaya_award_0830.html.

275 Sohn, J. (ed.) Development without Conflict: The Business Case for Community Consent (World Resources Institute: Washington DC, 2007). International Finance Corporation, Stakeholder Engagement: A Good Practice Handbook for Companies Doing Business in Emerging Markets (International Finance Corporation: Washington DC, 2007). Solleza, C. M. and Barnes ‘Shell Malampaya,’ (Case study, unpublished, Asian Institute of Management, Synergos Institute: Makati City and New York, 2003).

276 In this incident, the mine-tailings dam of Marcopper Mining Corporation broke, releasing millions of tons of toxic material into the two main rivers which served as the freshwater and fishing resource of the capitol and main population center of the small island-province of Marinduque. The island and its populace have never truly recovered from that disaster. For more information, see UNEP Division of Technology Industry and Economics, ‘MRF Incidents: Marinduque (Marcopper Mine) – Tailings Dam Failure, Philippines, March 1996’, United Nations Environment Program, www.mineralresourcesforum.org/incidents/Marinduque/index.htm (Accessed 21 April 2008).

277 The EIA rules defined social acceptability as ‘the result of a process mutually agreed upon by the DENR, key stakeholders, and the proponent to ensure that the valid and relevant concerns of the stakeholders, including affected communities, are considered and/or resolved in the decision-making process for granting or denying the issuance of an ECC’. Department of Environment and Natural Resources, DENR Administrative Order No. 9637 Revising DENR Administrative Order No. 21, Series of 1992, to Further Strengthen the Implementation of the Environmental Impact Statement System, (Department of Environment and Natural Resources, 1996) Article I, Section 1.0.cc.

278 Republic Act No. 7160, An Act Providing for a Local Government Code of 1991, 1991 (Philippines) Sec. 26 and 27.

279 Woodward-Clyde Inc., ‘Environmental Impact Statement, Malampaya Gas Project: Final Report Appendices F and G’ (DENR Environmental Management Bureau: Quezon City, 1997). Hereafter ‘Malampaya EIS, App. F & G’) (Woodward-Clyde Inc.: 1997)

280 However, records of these initial consultations are not publicly available as they were not part of the formal EIS documentation. Facundo Roco, Executive Director of the PSFI at the time, asserts that due to these informal consultations, which revealed biodiversity and local community concerns, an onshore pipeline passing through Mindoro Oriental was not chosen as a first option. See Roco F. and Agabin, K. Power From the Deep: The Malampaya Story, Vol. 1 (Shell Philippines Exploration BV: Makati City Philippines, 2005) p. 39–40.

281 Republic Act No. 7611, An Act Adopting the Strategic Environmental Plan for Palawan, Creating the Administrative Machinery for Its Implementation, Converting the Palawan Integrated Area Development Project Office to Its Support Staff, Providing Funds, 1992 (Philippines).

282 Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Environmental Compliance Certificate No. 9708-001-207c paragraph 20.

283 Ibid., paragraphs 21–22.

284 In 2000, a year prior to full operation, Chevron Texaco of the United States and the Philippine National Oil Company bought a 45 percent and 10 percent stake, respectively, in the project.

285 Sohn, (ed.) Development Without Conflict: The Business Case for Community Consent, pp. 19–26.

286 Ibid.

287 For example, within the first year of operations, there were reports from Bulalacao, the southernmost municipality of Mindoro Oriental, that the pipeline, located within 5 kilometres from its shores, was generating noise that was keeping the fish away from the municipal fishing grounds. This was also reported in the Municipality of Pola, further north. These reports were sent to the MMT in April 2002, and in response a scientific team was commissioned to conduct noise-monitoring activities. After two monitoring expeditions in November 2002 and January 2003, the team did not find evidence of the reported unusual noise. Sometime in 2005, an unusual algal bloom (red tide) was sighted in the waters of northern Palawan where the pipeline passed through on its way to Mindoro. The local communities reported this to the MMT because they thought it was the result of a pipeline leak. The ensuing investigation revealed that the bloom actually originated somewhere in the northeastern waters of Palawan and was being carried by ocean currents on a westerly course through the area. In 2006, the Palawan monitoring team investigated a reported oil spill that washed up along the shores of El Nido, the municipality closest and adjacent to the offshore production platform took samples and sent them for analysis in Manila. Although the origins of the oil slick could not be ascertained, analysts concluded that it was likely to have come from fishing boats, ocean-going vessels, or other drilling activities west of Palawan rather than the natural gas production platform itself. These and other instances indicate that the MMT is indeed an active and responsive mechanism sensitive to reports and observations from the local communities.

288 Woodward-Clyde Inc., ‘Malampaya EIS, App. F & G’

289 United Nations, ‘Declaration on Environment and Development’ UN Doc.A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1. (31 I.L.M. 814, 1992).

290 Secretariat of the Commission on Biological Diversity, Akwé: Kon Voluntary guidelines for the conduct of cultural, environmental, and social impact assessments regarding developments proposed to take place on, or which are likely to impact on, sacred sites and on lands and waters traditionally occupied or used by indigenous and local communities. (Secretariat Convention on Biological Diversity: Montreal, 2004).

291 This is the challenge posed by the concept of governance in modern society. The concept of the network society was proposed in Manuel Castells. The Rise of the Network Society. 2nd ed. (Malden; Oxford; Victoria: Blackwell Publishing, 2000), while the development of the concept of public governance is described in Bovaird, Tony. ‘Public Governance: Balancing Stakeholder Power in a Network Society’. International Review of Administrative Sciences Vol. 71, No.2, 2002, pp. 217–228 . The resulting complexities and challenges of governance are described in Cash, D. et al.. ‘Scale and cross-scale dynamics: Governance and information in a multi-level world’ Ecology and Society Vol. 11, No. 2, p. 8. Available at www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss2/art8/

292 Woodward-Clyde Inc., ‘Malampaya EIS, App. F & G’.(Woodward-Clyde Inc.: 1997).Copies of the submitted municipal certifications are included in Appendix F. Non-endorsement by Naujan and Bulalacao were verified in field interviews; this means that the municipal councils of the said municipalities did not issue any formal resolutions about the project.

293 The proponent sponsored a provincial anti-malaria campaign which is seen as having been successful in substantially reducing malaria cases in the years after its commencement, and is currently supporting an innovative barangay health services and insurance program.

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