

# **Completing the Work of the Roving Ambassador for the Three Basins – Phase III (The Three Basins Project)**

**Evaluation Report**

**- Final Version -**

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## Abbreviations and Acronyms

CCI	Clinton Climate Initiative
COP	Conference of parties
CSO	Civil society organisation
FLEGT	Forest law enforcement, governance and trade
FLR	Forest Landscape Restoration
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature
LDIP	Low-Deforestation Investment Portfolio
LPAA	Lima Paris Action Agenda
MADS	Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development (Colombia)
Norad	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NICFI	Norwegian International Climate and Forests Initiative
NOK	Norwegian Kronor
NRR	National Restoration Roundtable
RA	Roving Ambassador
REDD+	Reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
USD	United States Dollar
VPA	Voluntary Partnership Agreement
WRI	World Resources Institute

# 1. Background and Introduction

## 1.1. Background and origins of the project

The “Three Basins” refers to the Congo Basin, the Amazon Basin and the forest-rich countries of Southeast Asia and includes 28 countries<sup>1</sup> (10 in the Congo Basin, 8 in the Amazon Basin and 10 in SE Asia). The forests of the Three Basins (TB) include 80% of the world’s tropical forests, as well as important areas of flooded forest and areas for forest restoration. These forests are rich in carbon and biodiversity and are home to hundreds of millions of people [2].

On June 3<sup>rd</sup> 2011 a summit to discuss the major issues affecting forests was held that included heads of state and representatives of the tropical countries of the Amazon Basin, the Congo Basin and South East Asia, as well as representatives of the UN and other organisations, including the Clinton Climate Initiative (CCI) [2]. During the summit the heads of state and government nominated the then president of Guyana, H.E. Mr Bharrat Jagdeo as Roving Ambassador (RA) for the forests of the TB [2]. In March 2012 Bharrat Jagdeo began his role as RA, with his presidency having come to an end in late 2011 [2].

In March 2012, the Norwegian International Climate and Forestry Initiative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs agreed to provide funding to CCI to support an initiative to promote cooperation between important forest-rich countries of the three equatorial land basins – Amazonia, Central Africa and S.E. Asia. The programme is carried out in conjunction with IUCN and led by Bharrat Jagdeo and his team in his new role as RA of the TB countries [27].

The TB program is based on informal discussions that happened during 2011-2012 amongst government officials, senior policy makers and institutional and civil society stakeholders across the TB and Annex I countries<sup>2</sup>. Consensus was reached that TB countries have made significant progress in reconciling the use of forests with national and global sustainable development. However, many TB partners expressed frustration that political and societal commitment to action on forests is frequently not supported by efficient access to the significant funding commitments that have been made by industrialised countries. Conversely, some Annex I partners expressed a view that forest countries are not yet ready for international finance at scale, even where committed [27].

To address this apparent mismatch, the overall objective of the RA was to: “Enable an accelerated transition from deforestation and towards restoration of the forest landscape in TB countries during the period before 2020” [2]. This was to be achieved by supporting the establishment of ambitious partnerships between TB and Annex I countries at a national and regional level, as well as supporting broader international and multilateral efforts leading to a REDD+ mechanism being agreed under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the ‘Bonn Challenge’ – a global movement to restore 150 million hectares of degraded and deforested land by 2020 and 350 million hectares by 2030. The RA supported this objective in the run up to, and immediately after, COP21 of the UNFCCC in December 2015 where the new Paris Climate Agreement was agreed [2].

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<sup>1</sup> Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname, Venezuela, Brunei, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam

<sup>2</sup> Annex I countries are signatories to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) defined as either industrialised or economies in transition

## 1.2. The Three Basins Project

The Three Basins project was operational from March 2012 to December 2015. In achieving its overall objective, the project had three goals:

1. *Advance the global policy agenda around forests and inclusive low carbon development in forest countries [17].*

The rationale behind this goal was the need to raise political awareness, and strengthen commitment for action on climate change mitigation before 2020, at the highest levels in both forest and Annex 1 countries. The activities implemented under this goal were intended to inform and be informed by the UNFCCC process which was evolving during this period, but with a particular focus on supporting the international community's objective of agreeing a global, legally binding climate agreement by the end of 2015 [2].

2. *Catalyse and support the establishment of ambitious interim REDD+ partnerships between Annex 1 and Three Basin country governments [17].*

This goal was included to build on political will generated under the first goal, by supporting the establishment of ambitious interim REDD+ partnerships between Annex 1 and TB country governments. These partnerships were designed to provide both financial as well as technical support to "transformative action" around forest management at jurisdictional levels of scale [2].

3. *Support broad-based south-south learning and information sharing, and collaboration across the countries of the Three Basins, as well as better collaboration between forest countries, Annex 1 countries and international organisations [17].*

This third goal aimed to support broad-based south-south learning and information sharing, and collaboration across TB countries, as well as better collaboration between forest countries, Annex 1 countries and international organisations [2].

The project was implemented in three distinct phases:

- Phase I: Initiating phase in run up to Rio+20 (March – June 2012)
- Phase II: Launch phase (July 2012 – September 2013)
- Phase III: Scaling phase (2014 and 2015)

Phase I was essentially an inception and planning phase, in which the RA and the Minister of Sustainable Development, the Forest Economy and the Environment for the Republic of Congo Henri Djombo undertook consultations with leaders from TB countries as well as REDD+ donors, regional organisations & CSOs. IUCN and CCI contributed to this work by providing expert knowledge about REDD+ policies and processes, and sharing key lessons learned from extensive work in TB countries. The objective of this first phase was to explore initial ideas on how TB countries can move forward towards sustainable land use, including forests, and opportunities that could be provided by partnering with financing countries. During phase I it became clear there was significant lack of understanding of what ambitious financial partnerships might look like. Questions were raised among both forest and Annex 1 countries about the willingness of other parties to participate in such partnerships. [2;26]

Phase II was designed to build on phase I and move interested countries along a path of greater understanding and action, and to set foundations for ambitious action before 2020. Through one-to-one meetings and broader engagement strategies, the RA and his team continued to advance the creation of an environment for ambitious financial partnerships

for accelerated action on forests, in particular addressing information gaps and misunderstandings. [2;28]

During Phases I and II, informal soundings among Heads of State and Government, senior policy makers and institutional and civil society stakeholders across TB and Annex I countries highlighted considerable consensus that significant progress has been made in recent years on the challenge of reconciling the use of forests and its restoration with both national and global sustainable development. In addition, the need for significant, sustained and accessible funding to achieve this goal was widely recognised, within the Cancun Agreements of 2010, the 2011 Durban Platform for Enhanced Action and the Bonn Challenge. Clear potential for scaling beyond progress beyond Phase II existed. [1,2]

In phase III, work focused on two overarching objectives [2]:


1. Continuing to support the shaping of the international policy agenda around forests and inclusive low carbon development in forest countries, in support of the UNFCCC process up to COP21.
2. Support specific ambitious partnerships, based on a pipeline of demand from forest countries.
  - 2a - Facilitate the advance of Colombia's ambitious partnership.
  - 2b - Facilitating the assessment of Colombia's national/subnational restoration potential.
  - 2c - Support up to three other ambitious partnerships for jurisdiction-wide action.

The project team was composed of (i) The RA's Team, (ii) IUCN and (iii) CCI. IUCN played two roles as both the fiduciary agent/project coordinator and in providing technical support. The RA Team was administered by Kevin Hogan Advisory Services Ltd. comprised of Team Leader Kevin Hogan, Lead Specialist Anna Creed and a Research Analyst. CCI provided technical and strategic as well as in-country support [7]. During Phase III, CCI had a relatively minor role in the project, with a specific focus on undertaking an assessment of forest restoration potential in Colombia. In Phase III, IUCN had overall responsibility for implementing subcomponent 2b. During the course of implementation, IUCN (together with WRI) secured an additional grant from Norad (with a budget of NOK 75 million , equivalent to around USD 9 million) to support forest landscape restoration in six countries (including Colombia). As such, much of the activities relating to FLR in Colombia were transferred away from the TB project to the FLR project to avoid any risk of double funding.

Throughout the life of the TB project, institutional arrangements have changed somewhat. In Phases I and II, funds flowed from the Norwegian government to CCI, were then transferred to IUCN and then on to the RA team. This rather tortuous route proved to be administratively cumbersome so in the third phase a decision was taken to channel funds from the Norwegian government to IUCN, who then developed sub-agreements with CCI and Kevin Hogan Advisory Services.

At the end of the three phases it was envisaged that sufficient change would be catalysed to enable countries to move forward without specific support from the RA and his team. [1] An overall timeline for the three phases of the project are presented graphically in Figure 1.

**Figure 1: Timeline of the three phases of the Three Basins Project**



**3.1 Figure 1.** Timeline of key events or milestones during the lifetime of the Three Basins

### 1.3. Evaluation objectives, approach and methods

This review was commissioned by IUCN on behalf of the Norwegian government. The aim of the review is defined as follows:

*“To review project outcomes to better understand and communicate the learning, and contribution to change, from the Phase 3 of the Roving Ambassador for the Three Basins Project (1 January 2014 – 31 December 2015), financed by the Norwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment”.*

The purpose of the evaluation is to assess the project’s relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. In particular, the evaluation will answer the following questions:

- What main changes did the project contribute to at global and national scales?
- Are those changes being sustained?
- How did the project contribute to those changes?
- What were the main enabling and constraining factors that helped or hindered contribution to change?
- What key lessons should Norway Ministry of Climate and Environment and other partners be aware of?

The evaluation is desk-based, and does not include visits to any of the Three Basin countries. The assessment is based on a review of project-generated literature as well as interviews with key persons involved in (and benefitting from) the project itself. The evaluation was conducted between September and October 2016.

A note on sources: Interviews were held as part of this review and used to generate evidence behind findings and conclusions. Individuals are not named, but where relevant are presented in a coded form in brackets using the format “E1xx”). Where documents are referenced they are done so using a number system, which can be found in Annex II of this document. For example, [10] refers to “Delivering Ambition on Forests. Maintaining and enhancing one of the world’s greatest assets. Roving Ambassador for the Three Basins Initiative. President Bharrat Jagdeo. May 2015”.

## 2. Relevance and design

### 2.1. Relevance of the programme to global and national priorities

The TB project has consistently shown a high degree of relevance, at both national and international levels, within the context of evolving policies on forests and climate change.

At the international level, the project was specifically designed to support the unfolding UNFCCC process and moves to ensure a strong focus on forests within the COP21 agenda. Specifically, the project supported the “Road to Paris” set out by Peruvian and French presidencies of the UNFCCC COPs. By engaging at the highest political levels, the project was in a position to support, engage with and ultimately influence the outcome of the Paris climate agreement.

At the national level, the project was able to engage in a way that put host countries in the driving seat of negotiating new partnerships for results-based action. This was particularly evident in the case of Colombia where the project helped the government forge a new partnership with the governments of Germany, Norway and UK on forests. This partnership was supported at a high political level within Colombia and relates strongly to the “Amazon Vision” strategy.

### 2.2. Theory of change, intervention logic, risks and assumptions

There is no explicit theory of change that was developed for the TB project. In order to evaluate it effectively, there is a need to “deconstruct” the underlying envisaged change process and rationale, and subject this to external scrutiny.

The three phases of the TB project sought to influence national and international policy with a view to developing “transformative change” within forest-rich nations, through partnerships with bilateral results-based payment initiatives. As such, the TB project aimed to influence domestic policy in TB countries, help forge partnerships between forest-rich nations and sources of international REDD+ financing, as well as influence the unfolding international policy agenda being developed under UNFCCC. This was achieved through a facilitation and brokering function, which was provided through the project. As such, the TB project sought to support two impact pathways – at international and national levels.

Within participating countries, political will would be translated into action through the mobilisation of financing and technical support around landscape-level investments. The appointment of the RA was central to the approach, as he was seen as a change agent who could influence high-level policy change within other TB countries. With regard to theories of change within the domestic policy arena, the approach adopted by the project fits most closely with the “diffusion theory of change”, developed by Everett Roger. Diffusion theory refers to the process by which a change agent (e.g. individual, informal group, or organization) models or communicates an innovation. (See Annex VI for more details). The innovation can be as diverse as a product, practice, program, policy, or idea [28]. The change agent is widely perceived as a trusted individual, who is able to communicate the innovation or idea in way that addresses the interests of the user.

With regard to influencing the international policy agenda, the approach adopted by the TB project fits best with the “policy window” theory of change [28] (See Annex V for more details). The Policy Windows theory is John Kingdon’s classic theory of agenda-setting, that attempts to clarify why some issues get attention in the policy process and others do not. He identified three “streams” related to the policy system:

1. **Problems:** The way social conditions become defined as “a problem” to policy makers, including the problem’s attributes, its status, the degree of social consciousness of the issue, and whether the problem is perceived as solvable with clear alternatives.
2. **Policies:** The ideas generated to address problems.
3. **Politics:** Political factors, including the “national mood” (e.g. appetite for “big government”), campaigns by interest groups and advocates, and changes in elected officials.

According to this theory, to increase the likelihood that an issue will receive serious attention or be placed on the policy agenda, at least two of the streams need to converge at critical moments or “policy windows”. Policy windows are windows of opportunity that arise when there is the possibility for policy change. In the case of the TB project, the policy window refers to the UNFCCC COP21 meeting in Paris, at which it was hoped a comprehensive climate agreement could be brokered between parties to the agreement. For this to happen, a sufficient body of parties would need to recognize the degree of the problem (at domestic level) and accept the proposed policy actions designed to address the problem. In order to influence such policy processes, the theory suggests that strategies such as capacity building (including relationships and knowledge), development of coalitions, and framing the problem (and its implications) may all contribute to achieving policy change.

As discussed in later sections of this report, both of these two theories – the diffusion theory and policy windows theory - appear to have been validated by project experience at the domestic and international levels respectively. This is expanded on in more detail in Sections 3, 5 and 6.

Indicators presented in the project document are process and outcome-oriented rather than impact-oriented indicators. Instead of hectares of forests conserved, or number of forest dependent households positively impacted, indicators refer to outcome of meetings, increased commitment, development of partnerships, which it is assumed will lead to these higher level impacts post-project. This reflects the policy-based nature of this project.

The project document outlines two objectives, a series of actions and associated indicators designed to assess performance over the life of the project [2]. The two overall objectives are presented below:

1. Continuing to support the shaping of the international policy agenda around forests and inclusive low carbon development in forest countries, in support of the UNFCCC process up to COP21.
2. Support specific ambitious partnerships, based on a pipeline of demand from forest countries.

These two objectives reflect the intention of the project to work at global levels (Objective 1) and national levels (Objective 2). Objective 1 has two actions:

- **Action 1a:** Advance the policy agenda through establishing ‘ambitious interim finance for REDD+’ on agendas of existing key international organisations & networks with high-level and broad reach
- **Action 1b:** Continue to engage with senior policy makers and influencers, as well as technical teams, in targeted three basins countries and potential donors who have the potential for ambitious partnerships to be forged during the 2013-2015 timeframe.

These two actions are somewhat inconsistent, as 1a relates to shaping the international agenda (in line with the objective) while 1b relates to forging partnerships within TB countries, which one might expect to fall under Objective 2.

The four actions under objective two appear to be consistent, and all relate to influencing policy and decisions at country level within TB countries.

Furthermore, the structure of the logical framework for the project has elements that are not fully logical. Objectives have indicators, while “actions” have “deliverables”. However, some actions (such as 2 a, b and c) have both deliverables as well as actions, creating inconsistencies and some repetition. These inconsistencies are reflected in project reporting where activities are stated as reported under other indicators for the purposes of “streamlined reporting”.

The project proposal lists four risks [7]:

1. *Possible change in government administration or policies in either donor or TB countries.*
2. *Absence of enabling conditions for implementation of ambitious partnerships, even if political and administrative will is present.*  
The exact meaning of this risk is somewhat unclear and is not clarified in the project document.
3. *Poor progress in international UNFCCC negotiations.*  
This risk was assessed as relatively low in the project document with comment provided that UNFCCC negotiations had positive outputs in 2014 [3].
4. *Lack of awareness of and interest in mitigation opportunities.*  
The risk was assessed to be low within the countries targeted. Evidence existed of high level commitment to address climate change mitigation [3].

There was no systematic reporting of risk status across the life of the project. Quarterly reports simply stated that risks were “managed” and there is no discussion of actual risks that materialised in the final report [4, 5, 6]. No new risks were identified during the course of programme implementation.

### 3. Effectiveness

#### 3.1. Progress towards project objectives

As mentioned in 2.2, the Phase III Project Document had various indicators, actions and “deliverables” under each of the different objectives. An assessment of progress towards meeting the agreed objective level indicators are presented in Table 1, using a traffic light system of green (reflecting full achievement), orange (reflecting partial achievement) and red (reflecting non-achievement). In complex policy settings, with a range of actors contributing towards the same goal, definitive statements on the attribution of any single project are likely to be tenuous<sup>3</sup>. As such, a more productive approach relates to assessing contribution. Table 1 shows key activities in the second column, which the project have either implemented themselves or contributed directly towards. Further actions can be found in the timeline presented in Figure 1 (on page 6).

**Table 1.** Overview of overall progress made towards project objectives<sup>4</sup>

Indicator	Evidence of project contribution to objectives	Status by end of project
<b>Objective 1: Continue to support the shaping of the international agenda</b>		
<b>Indicator 1:</b> Tabled for discussion by heads of State and senior ministers at identified meetings, summarized in Engagement Plan and a report on its implementation.	<b>Strong contribution</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Supported “Road to Paris” with:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Strong presence of forests in LPAA [11; 12]</li> <li>Completed ‘Rediscovering Ambition report’ [10]</li> </ul> </li> <li>Heads of State meeting at COP21 in Paris [2: Annex 1]</li> <li>Ministerial-level meetings in Bonn [11] and UN General Assembly [13]</li> </ul>	<b>Achieved</b>
<b>Indicator 2:</b> More countries are committed to ambitious forest action, to increase the likelihood of reaching a critical mass that can have a global mitigation and development income, as well as improving the context for agreeing a global climate deal. From these countries, it is hoped that at least 3 will proceed to finalizing actual partnerships	<b>Moderate contribution</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>COP21 Leaders Statement on forests [2: Annex 2]</li> <li>Strong presence of forests in LPAA [12]</li> <li>Colombia and Peru established ambitious partnerships, discussions with Suriname initiated</li> <li>However, “critical mass” of countries with global mitigation and development impact has not been achieved</li> </ul>	<b>Partially Achieved</b>
<b>Objective 2: Support new and emerging jurisdiction-wide ambitious partnerships.</b>		
<b>Indicator 1:</b> Donor discussions are underway with three countries towards signature of new ambitious partnerships with Norway/UK/Germany.	<b>Moderate contribution</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Two countries (Colombia [2: Annex 4] and Peru) signed ambitious partnerships.</li> </ul>	<b>Partially achieved</b>

<sup>3</sup> Mayne, J. 1999. Addressing attribution through contribution analysis: Using performance measures sensibly. Office of the Auditor General of Canada

<sup>4</sup> Figures in parentheses relate to specific documentary evidence, and titles can be referred to in Annex II.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Colombia announces ‘Colombia Sostenible’ and adopts completed Amazon Vision [2: Annex 5] into National Development Plan, developing Low-Deforestation Investment Portfolio [15] and financial mechanism [2: Annex 6; 16], as well as forest restoration assessments [2: Annex 10].</li> <li>• Peru signs partnership letter of intent, and strategic support received such as with regard to funding structures</li> <li>• Initial discussions started with Suriname, but did not evolve substantially</li> </ul>	
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Table 1 shows good progress under objective 1 and partial progress under objective 2, due to the fact that while partnerships have been concluded in Colombia and good progress is reported in Peru, other partnerships in other TB countries were not forthcoming as anticipated.

### 3.2. Achievement of planned actions, deliverables and indicators

Table 2 provides a summary overview of actual progress made against deliverables and indicators for each of the defined actions presented in the Phase III project document.

**Table 2.** Overview of overall progress made against project actions, deliverables and indicators.

Action	Deliverable	Status by end of project
<b>Objective 1: Continue to support the shaping of the international agenda</b>		
<p><b>Action 1a:</b> Advance the policy agenda through establishing ‘ambitious interim finance for REDD+’ on agendas of existing key international organisations &amp; networks with high-level and broad reach including but not limited to: European Union (EU), the Commonwealth, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Union of South America (UNASUR), and GLOBE.</p>	<p><b>Deliverable:</b> i) Roving Ambassador meetings with key political and other stakeholders, ii) Presentations at key meetings and events, iii) Closer integration with work of regional associations.</p>	<p><b>Fully achieved</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Supported “Road to Paris” with: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Strong presence of forests in LPAA [11; 12]</li> <li>- Completed ‘Rediscovering Ambition report’ [10]</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Heads of state meeting in Paris COP21 produces leaders statement [2: Annex 2]</li> <li>• Meeting of Environment ministers at UN General Assembly [13]</li> <li>• Ministerial-level discussions in Bonn [11]</li> <li>• TB Initiative meeting in FAO Rome forms TB Secretariat (Guyana, Brazil and Republic of Congo).</li> </ul>
<p><b>Action 1b:</b> Continue to engage with senior policy makers and influencers, as well as technical teams, in targeted Three Basins countries and potential donors who have the potential for ambitious partnerships to be forged during the 2013-2015 timeframe.</p>	<p><b>Deliverable:</b> Identification of forest countries and donor partners to progress ambitious partnerships in 2014/2015</p>	<p><b>Partially achieved</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Further engagement with was achieved in Colombia, Peru and Suriname as well as donor countries (as per Actions 1a and 2c).</li> <li>• However, no engagement (during Phase III) with countries in Congo Basin or SE Asia forest basins</li> </ul>

<b>Objective 2: Support new and emerging jurisdiction-wide ambitious partnerships.</b>		
<b>Action 2a:</b> Colombia - providing ongoing strategic advice for senior policy-makers.	<b>Indicator 1:</b> Senior-level Political Statement by the Colombian Government outlining a specific, measurable commitment to ambitious action, subject to appropriate international support.	<b>Fully Achieved</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Colombia announces 'Colombia Sostenible', to which TB project contributed</li> <li>Amazon Vision document fully internalised by senior government representatives, to which TB contributed strongly in drafting.</li> </ul>
	<b>Indicator 2:</b> Amazon Vision completed, and launched publicly after a broad-based multi-stakeholder consultation.	<b>Fully Achieved</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Amazon Vision document completed and adopted into National Development plan [2: Annex 5]. Strong role of TB project in drafting this document</li> </ul>
	<b>Indicator 3:</b> Signed Partnership Agreement in place with international partners, with specific, measurable climate mitigation, poverty alleviation and socio-economic targets identified.	<b>Fully Achieved</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Colombia, Norway, Germany and UK announce \$300M partnership, with confirmed initial funding of \$100M [2: Annex 4]. TB project played strong role in negotiating aspects of the agreement in Colombia.</li> </ul>
	<b>Indicator 4:</b> Financial mechanism included in Partnership Agreement.	<b>Fully Achieved</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>TB project developed financial mechanism to support LDIP &amp; channel funds from REM to Amazon Vision activities [2: Annex 6; 16]</li> </ul>
	<b>Indicator 5:</b> Investment Portfolio interventions start implementation, utilising proposed financial mechanism	<b>Partially achieved</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Low-Deforestation Investment Portfolio (LDIP) developed [15]</li> <li>Financial mechanism yet to become operational, but this is due to factors beyond the control of the project</li> </ul>
	<b>Indicator 6:</b> Lessons learned and innovations are being shared among early-moving forest countries to catalyse common approaches where appropriate	<b>Fully Achieved</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>South-south learning exchange organised by TB project</li> <li>Project helped to facilitate lessons shared from Guyana and Brazil [17;18;19;20]</li> </ul>
	<b>Deliverable i)</b> Colombia - supporting the Colombian government in advancing the Colombia/Norway/Germany/UK partnership, and helping to embed it as a central Government-wide priority	<b>Fully Achieved</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Colombia, Norway, Germany and UK announce \$300M partnership through REM program, with confirmed initial funding of \$100M [2: Annex 4]</li> <li>Colombia announce 'Colombia Sostenible'</li> <li>Updated Amazon Vision delivered by Colombian Government [2: Annex 5]</li> <li>National Development Plan 2014-2018 adopts Amazon Vision</li> <li>Adoption by key govt. entities of draft investment plan to address drivers of deforestation for Amazon region.</li> <li>Development of investment portfolio – Low-Deforestation Investment</li> </ul>

		<p>Portfolio (LDIP) – to promote zero net deforestation goal [15]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Development of financing mechanism to support LDIP.</li> </ul>
	<p><b>Deliverable ii)</b> Colombia – helping the Government to design the financial mechanism for international partnerships, and liaising with GGGI in the design of the Amazon Vision investment portfolio</p>	<p><b>Fully achieved</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• RA recommended GGGI to support MADS</li> <li>• Technical support to GGGI and MADS re. financial mechanism, LDIP, REL &amp; MRV</li> <li>• Guidance on channelling REM funds to Amazon Vision activities &amp; Proposal Note on requirements and objectives of financial mechanism [16]</li> </ul>
	<p><b>Deliverable iii)</b> Colombia – facilitating South-South lesson-sharing between Colombia and other countries with ambitious partnerships, most notably Guyana and Brazil (working in close collaboration with the Amazon Fund).</p>	<p><b>Fully achieved</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• MRV approaches in Guyana shared</li> <li>• “lessons learned” in Guyana and Brazil shared with Colombia [17; 18; 19;20]</li> <li>• IUCN host participants from 24 countries (incl. Colombia) for south-south exchange on forest restoration assessments</li> </ul>
<p><b>Action 2b:</b> Colombia - preparing for and supporting the implementation of national or subnational restoration assessment(s).</p>	<p><b>Indicator 1:</b> Quantification of restoration and carbon sequestration potential -- Restoration Opportunities Assessment Methodology (ROAM) report including map and economic analysis.</p>	<p><b>Partially achieved</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Forest Restoration Potential in Colombia report completed [2; Annex 10]. National map included. Economic analysis of restoration potential needed but for greater precision it was decided to transfer this element to sub-national assessments.</li> <li>• Subnational restoration assessments using ROAM prepared and proposals prepared</li> </ul>
	<p><b>Deliverable:</b> Collaborate with national government to undertake and identify priority landscapes for restoration of degraded lands.</p>	<p><b>Achieved (Partially achieved by this project, and full achieved under a parallel project funded by Norad)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Subnational restoration assessments using ROAM prepared and proposals prepared</li> <li>• TB project represented at Bonn Challenge meeting</li> <li>• Colombia committed 1Mha of degraded land to Bonn Challenge &amp; part of 20x20 Initiative</li> <li>• IUCN hosted participants from 24 countries (incl. Colombia) for south-south exchange on forest restoration assessments.</li> <li>• Two-year roadmap of activities developed.</li> <li>• Review of existing restoration initiatives and programmes completed.</li> <li>• Study to assess national forest landscape restoration potential completed [2; Annex 10].</li> <li>• Initiated Humboldt Institute partnership to assist with sub-national</li> </ul>

		<p>restoration assessment into future.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Humboldt representative trained in ROAM during FLR Forum organised by IUCN in Washington DC in 2015.</li> <li>• IUCN recruited FLR Coordinator based in S. America regional office to lead FLR outreach, technical assessments and policy uptake.</li> <li>• National Restoration Roundtable (NRR) proposed.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Action 2c:</b> Work with up to three (3) further early moving countries according to their need, and in response to their requests for help. This may include providing information on how such a deal works and how of value to them, and/ or assisting them to draw up their 'partnership proposal' to Annex I country/ forest country respectively. This will require more specific technical support and facilitation</p>	<p><b>Indicator 1:</b> Donor discussions are underway with three countries towards signature of new ambitious partnerships with Norway/UK/ Germany</p>	<p><b>Partially achieved.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Further to Colombia, only Peru has been supported, representing 1 additional country. Letter of Intent signed for \$300M partnership.</li> <li>• Peruvian government was supported to design a financial mechanism for managing and disbursing results based financing</li> <li>• Initial conversations with Suriname underway by project close.</li> </ul>
	<p><b>Deliverable:</b> To be determined according to country need.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No deliverables identified or reported</li> </ul>

In summary, the project has progressed well on its stated indicators and deliverables. Only one significant shortfall is identified, relating to the early ambition of delivering partnerships outside Colombia. By the end of the project, some limited progress was made with supporting Peru, but beyond that other countries such as Suriname and Liberia were only reached superficially (EI01, EI08, EI09). The underlying reason for this was due to the demand-led approach that the project took. Support and advice was only provided to countries where there was a clear demand as well as likelihood of reaching some kind of partnership agreement. While Suriname had a level of interest from within certain parts of government, there was little realistic offer of support from external donors. Early discussions in central Africa had generated some interest, but this did not evolve into a clear and tangible demand being directed to the RA team (EI09)

## 4. Efficiency

It is difficult to provide any conclusive data on the overall level of value for money or efficiency of the third phase of this programme for a number of reasons. Firstly, and as discussed in section 5 below, attributing impact to the specific actions of this programme are difficult. Secondly, as indicators of success are largely process rather than result based, comparing any identified outputs with other similar projects is particularly challenging.

On a very basic level it is possible to compare the total budget of Phase III (NOK 8.2 million or USD 1.3 million) with the total amount of money agreed or pledged, or agreed in partnership agreements with Peru and Colombia (USD 600 million total pledged, with USD 100 million thus far approved), this represents an impressive degree of leveraging.

Attributing (and claiming) this directly to the TB project is likely to be problematic as it is likely that these (or similar) sums may have been forthcoming without the presence of the TB project. However, what is clear is that TB project supported the two countries to prepare for and negotiate effectively around the terms of these agreements. As such, the contribution of the TB project is much clearer.

The strategy of the programme has been to leverage political will at national and international levels through the use of a respected and connected negotiating team. The theory of change recognises that perhaps the highest risk is an absence of political will, and this was addressed by engaging the RA and his team, during the first two phases of the project, who represented a mix of well-connected and informed negotiators, able to address the wider question of political will. This strategy reduced risk and increased overall efficiency of the programme across its three phases. The work of the RA team during the first two phases of the programme reduced this risk significantly, paving the way for the clear results that were realised in the final, third phase of the programme. By the time Phase III was approved, agreements in principle had been brokered between the governments of Peru and Colombia and bilateral partners in Europe, and the emphasis shifted to negotiating the finer points (practicalities) of these agreements.

### 4.1. Enabling factors

Some of the enabling factors that contributed to increasing overall efficiency and effectiveness include:

- Increasing understanding, acceptance and political will from countries in Latin America to engage in landscape level results-based partnerships around reducing deforestation.
- The presence of a skilled and trusted team, with high levels of political access and confidence from decision makers in the south as well as donor-countries.
- The relatively open-ended nature of the programme with a strong emphasis on process (such as the creation of partnerships) but with limited prescription of results. Flexible funding allowed the programme to tailor responses to emerging opportunities and policy windows.
- The increasing political attention that was generated by the run-up to the UNFCCC COP21 meeting in Paris, and growing demands that parties reach some kind of binding agreement, provided important political space into which the project was able to develop and support the LPAA.

### 4.2. Constraining factors

Some of the factors that contributed to constraining overall efficiency and effectiveness

include:

- **Complex administrative and financial arrangements:** In the first two phases, Norwegian government funding passed through two international organisations before reaching the RA team (EI04). This was far from efficient and created additional costs and delays. Even with funds routed through IUCN and then onto the CCI and the RA team (as was done in Phase III), delays were experienced. In some cases, this was due to delays in providing reports back to the Norwegian International Climate and Forests Initiative (NICFI), which in turn created delays in further tranches of project funding. In other cases, this was due to delays in concluding new agreements as the project moved through its three phases. These challenges were partially overcome by IUCN “fronting” resources to Kevin Hogan Associates over a nine-month period while agreement with Norad was being negotiated. However, administrative and contractual delays did impact in two main areas. Firstly, during the first six months of 2014 international travel was impossible due to shortage of funds. Furthermore, one of the key members of the team, Anna Creed, had to move to a half-time contract, again due to shortage of financing during the early stages of the project.
- **Limited role of IUCN beyond contract management:** IUCN had a relatively limited role in Phase III beyond contract management and co-ordination of the consortium (EI05, EI01). The action (2b) centred around landscape restoration was relatively minor compared with the broader and arguably more impactful agenda of negotiating and concluding partnership agreements and influencing the global climate change agenda. Furthermore, activities under 2b were ultimately transferred to the Norad-funded FLR project (Accelerating Action on REDD+ through Forest Landscape Restoration), which was co-financed with WRI [29]. Given the wide knowledge base of IUCN in REDD+ processes through their other on-going NICFI-funded activities, there was arguably a missed opportunity in terms of capturing and harnessing this expertise within the TB project. Furthermore, the linkages between the FLR work in Colombia and the other work being supported by the project in Colombia was limited, perhaps again leading to missed opportunities for synergy and greater efficiency. Delays in undertaking the landscape restoration work in Colombia meant that specific recommendations and priority actions were not included directly in the partnership agreement pipeline budget document.
- **Lima COP and Lima-Paris Action Agenda pre-occupying the Peruvian government:** Although the Peruvian government expressed strong levels of interest in moving ahead with negotiations around the partnership agreement, in reality much of the government machinery was heavily devoted to preparing for the Lima COP and supporting high-level negotiations around the LPAA (EI09). While generating important international benefits, this did mean that progress in supporting in-country negotiations in Peru were negatively impacted.

## 5. Outcomes

Within the context of the TB project, impact is assessed in terms of the degree to which policies have been shaped, financing mobilised and agreements/partnerships brokered. Impact is not assessed against the degree to which these policies or agreements were implemented nor the downstream effects that were generated (either for people or forests). As such, this chapter reviews the contribution of the TB project to delivering outcomes, rather than impacts, which are not possible to assess at this stage.

Generating a clear and unambiguous statement of impact is hampered by a number of factors relating to attribution and contribution. The TB project deliberately chose to work within complex contexts where multiple players were interacting and processes were proceeding on their own accord. The impact of the programme is essentially defined by how these existing processes were shaped, harnessed and developed. For example, partnership agreements would almost certainly have happened in both Peru and Colombia in the absence of the TB project, as both donors and host governments had expressed willingness to enter into these partnerships. The specific contribution of the TB project to these processes was to support host countries to articulate their own needs, develop realistic and practical proposals and to provide some of the finer detail relating to how the “deals” would be articulated.

Overall, four impact areas can be identified where strong evidence exists for the specific contribution of the TB project. These are summarised below:

- **Conceptualising and drafting the Amazon Vision Document:** The initial idea behind the Amazon Vision Document was conceived by the RA team, who promoted the concept to the Colombian Minister for Environment and following their endorsement, went on to make an initial draft for discussion. The Amazon Vision document is a potentially transformative strategy that for the first time places the Colombian Amazon region at the centre of government policy-making. Following support from the RA team, the government took ownership over the document, refined it and consulted widely and it went on to become a major policy pillar of the Ministry for Environment and Sustainable Development (MADS). The wide publicity (and political capital) that the policy was given within government in turn gave MADS a strengthened voice to counteract alternative views regarding forest exploitation that originated from ministries responsible for agriculture and mining. The Amazon Vision document also helped to lay a strong foundation for the government of Colombia to articulate its own position and intentions with regard to the development of a partnership agreement with European donor governments. (EI03, EI09)
- **Helping to finalise the planning on the Colombian partnership agreement:** European donors as well as the Colombian government had expressed a willingness to enter into a partnership agreement around REDD+ and results-based action. The RA team were able to provide a neutral and trusted source of support and advice to MADS in terms of identifying practical and workable options and solutions with regard to the implementation of the partnership agreement. The RA team helped build both confidence as well as capacity within MADS that enabled the agreement to proceed smoothly to a point that satisfied both parties. There is strong evidence by helping build the ambition level within the Colombian government, supported by well developed and implementable plans, the Norwegian government was able to consider allocating a higher overall budget to their contribution around the agreement. One particular area that the RA team helped with was with the design of the financial mechanism, a sensitive subject that has caused delays and bottlenecks in other countries negotiating

similar agreements. A key informant interviewed as part of this review process summarised the role of TB project as follows:

*“While the project did not have a direct role in securing the funds in the partnership agreement, it did have a very clear role in “sealing the deal” in Colombia, by helping the government develop realistic plans that could be presented to donors in a credible way” (EI10)*

- **Forging a new partnership between the government of Colombia and the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI):** When it became clear that additional funding was not likely to be forthcoming for a fourth phase of the TB project, the RA team were able to identify an alternative source of technical support, that could essentially continue to provide a similar role and function within Colombia. GGGI went on to establish a small team of 6 advisors who work with MADS to support the planning and execution of the partnership agreement. Working alongside MADS and other government agencies, progress has been made and in June 2016, an initial payment of USD 6 million was made. This will be followed by a second payment of USD 20 million by the end of 2016 assuming agreed performance indicators are met (EI09)
- **Facilitating a strong presence of forests in the LPAA and COP21 process:** The head of states meeting that was convened at the COP21 meeting in Paris made a strong statement on forests. There is strong evidence that without the TB project, this high-level statement of commitment on forests would not have been made. The strong and established links between Kevin Hogan and Mary Robinson (climate adviser to the UN Secretary General) were a key contributor to this. This is well summarised by an informant interviewed as part of this review:

*“Although its very hard to prove, the project played a critical behind-the-scenes role in terms of helping convene heads of states and raising forests up the political agenda as the drum-beat towards Paris grew louder with time” (EI08)*

## 6. Sustainability

To a degree, sustainability was built into the design of the project and its overall theory of change. By creating ownership, buy-in and political support and commitment for long-term, landscape-level measures designed to reduce deforestation and carbon emissions, sustainability at national level is assured. This domestic support has been reinforced by agreements over financing with international financing, which ensures that funding is unlikely (at least in the short term) to be a factor that will constrain sustainability.

Within the context of Colombia, the initial intensive inputs from the RA team have been transitioned to long-term in-country support from GGGI, which ensures that solid and neutral technical assistance will continue to be provided to national institutions (EI03). Support from GGGI has contributed to a successful launch of the partnership agreement, and has resulted in the first performance-based payment being made in June 2016, with a second payment agreed in principle by end of this year. As such, it appears that the government of Colombia is on a sustainable pathway and have a source of technical assistance now that the RA project has been completed (EI03, EI09).

Further financing to IUCN and WRI through NICFI to support FLR work will provide additional momentum to delivering real changes in land-use on the ground. Under component 2b of the TB project, the Humboldt Institute have been engaged to carry out the sub-national assessment of restoration opportunities in Antioquia State, which started in mid 2016. Furthermore, the project has proposed the establishment of the National Restoration Roundtable (NRR), with the objective of bringing together key players in restoration process who have a prominent role in the land use sector. The NRR, with representatives from Ministries and Humboldt Institute has already undertaken initial meetings, and support to this process will be maintained through the IUCN/WRI project funded by NICFI. Given all these promising signs, sustainability prospects for long-term forest-based emission reductions at jurisdictional level in Colombia are high.

Within the contexts of Peru, a statement a letter of intent has been signed, committing Peru to deliver landscape level emission reductions related to land-use. However, now that the project has ended, there is no clear sustainability strategy with regards to the provision of long-term and trusted technical support to ensure that the agreement reflects local needs, and is fully integrated and mainstreamed within the plans of national and local government institutions. Requests were made to the RA team for further support of this nature, but this has not been possible given funding considerations. Although other forms of support are available, they tend to be of a different nature. Norwegian climate funding to Peru has been channeled through UNDP, who are now responsible for sourcing and providing technical assistance. Furthermore, GIZ who have a long involvement in the forestry and natural resource sector in Peru, are also providing technical support to government. However, the model differs from Colombia, where a more nationally-embedded source of TA has now been secured through GGGI.

At the global level, recent signs indicate that political support has been maintained since the COP21. At the time of writing this report, it appears that the climate accord is set to become legally binding after November 4<sup>th</sup>, following its ratification by the EU, Canada, USA, China, India and 37 other nations. In this regard, it would appear that the relatively small part played by the TB project in terms of galvanizing political will around forests as an integral part of the climate accord was important in ensuring global attention and momentum was secured and maintained.

## 7. Lessons Learned

Lessons learned are presented in the context of those that would be of relevance to the Norwegian government as it moves forward with its International Climate and Forests Initiative (NICFI).

- A primary lesson learned has been the relevance and utility of providing high quality, flexible and responsive technical support to countries wishing to engage in complex, results-based emission reduction programmes. Technical support was not driven by any timeline or prioritisation from outside Colombia, but was demand-driven and based on emerging needs and priorities. This required a flexible and nimble approach to working, as well as a flexible funding arrangement that was not based on timed and pre-defined deliverables. A unique and perhaps defining aspect of the TB project was providing countries such as Colombia, and to a lesser degree Peru, expertise that was seen as acting within the primary interest of the host countries (rather than the donor agencies supporting the proposed partnership). This was necessary to ensure ownership, buy-in and acceptance by host country governments. This viewpoint is summarised in the following quote given as part of this review:

*“One of the defining aspects of this project was that countries felt that the project was fighting their corner and not representing interests of outside agencies. This helped to build ownership and engagement” (E107)*

- A second lesson, or emerging conclusion is that there is a clear need for such advisory services to countries over the long term. As new countries become engaged in emission reduction programmes (whether on a bilateral or multi-lateral basis) there will be a growing need for unbiased (and “untied”) technical support to national governments, which takes account of external donor requirements but is essentially embedded in domestic needs and priorities. Looking elsewhere in the forestry sector, one can see similar arrangements have been developed within the field of FLEGT/VPA. This is a highly complex and technical field, requiring strong political support and leadership. The European Union has helped facilitate the establishment of a “FLEGT Facility” within the European Forest Institute. This Facility has been able to build a cadre of expertise that is offered to producer countries who have expressed a willingness to enter into complex negotiations around improving timber legality and traceability. No such institution or facility exists within the field of REDD+, although the parallels are clearly apparent.
- A third lesson relates to building country ownership. This project has helped to “domesticate”, demystify and build local ownership around long-term forest based investments. It has been able to do so through the actions of its core facilitation team, and in particular the actions of its primary facilitator, Kevin Hogan. Kevin had a unique mix of skills – understanding of the international donor requirements, an appreciation of what was possible within the Colombian context and an ability to present a series of proposals that were clearly within the primary interests of Colombia. Although perhaps difficult to replicate and institutionalise, this does point to the need to rethink not just the quality of the technical support provided, but the “identity” of that support and the degree to which it is seen as representing domestic rather than international interests.

## Annex I: Persons consulted

<b>Name</b>	<b>Position</b>	<b>Institution</b>
Chris Buss	Senior Programme Officer Forest Conservation Programme	IUCN Headquarters, Gland, Switzerland
Julien Colomer	Monitoring & Learning Officer Global Forest & Climate Change Programme	IUCN Headquarters, Gland, Switzerland
Patrick Wylie	Senior REDD+ Advisor and Climate Change Mitigation Policy Officer	IUCN – US Office Washington DC
Kevin Hogan	Director	Kevin Hogan Associates
Stephen Devenish	Director, Forests and Landscapes	Clinton Climate Initiative
Jim Baker	Director, Global Carbon Measurement Program	Clinton Climate Initiative
Anna Creed	Standards Manager	Climate Bonds Initiative
Jason Eis	Executive Director	Vivid Economics
Per Pharo	Director	Norwegian International Climate and Forests Initiative (NICFI), Government of Norway
Carolina Jaramillo	Country Representative - Colombia	Global Green Growth Institute

## Annex II: Documents Consulted

### Phase III documentation

1. Completing the work of the Roving Ambassador for the Three Basins - Phase III. Supporting countries that wish to take action on forests. Final Technical Report 2015.
2. Completing the work of the Roving Ambassador for the Three Basins - Phase III. Supporting countries that wish to take action on forests. Final Technical Report August 2016 Resubmission (v2)
3. Completing the work of the Roving Ambassador for the Three Basins. Preliminary results achieved for Phase 3 (“scaling”). Technical report outline 2014.
4. Completing the work of the Roving Ambassador for the Three Basins. Preliminary results achieved for Phase 3 (“scaling”). Technical report Q1 2015.
5. Completing the work of the Roving Ambassador for the Three Basins. Preliminary results achieved for Phase 3 (“scaling”). Technical report Q2 2015.
6. Completing the work of the Roving Ambassador for the Three Basins. Preliminary results achieved for Phase 3 (“scaling”). Technical report Q3 2015.
7. Completing the work of the Roving Ambassador for the Three Basins. Supporting countries that wish to take action on forests. Phase III proposal.
8. Roving Ambassador for the Three Basins – Phase III. Project annual meeting minutes. 16<sup>th</sup> December 2015

### Phase III Annexes

9. Review of best practices for structure and governance of REDD+ funds. Report prepared for the Government of Peru. Vivid Economics. Draft report January 2016.
10. Delivering Ambition on Forests. Maintaining and enhancing one of the world’s greatest assets. Roving Ambassador for the Three Basins Initiative. President Bharrat Jagdeo. May 2015.
11. Annex 11 – Dinner to advance Lima Paris Action Agenda on Forests. 3<sup>rd</sup> June 2015
12. Annex 12 – Taking Forward the Lima Paris Action Agenda on Forests: Capturing ambition for the Lima Challenge. Concept note sent to countries. August 2015.
13. Annex 13 – Delivering ambition on forests: Maximising international collaboration on the road to Paris and beyond. High level ministerial meeting on forests and climate change. 28<sup>th</sup> September.
14. Annex 14 – Follow up survey for the LPAA Initiatives. Alliances and coalitions forum. 23<sup>rd</sup>-24<sup>th</sup> June 2016.
15. Annex 15 – Portafolio de Inversiones para el Programa de Visión Amazonía del Gobierno de Colombia. Propuesta para Programa REM. Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible de Colombia. Versión 1.0. December 2014.
16. Annex 16 – Financial Mechanism Options Paper. June 2014
17. Annex 17 – Delivering Guyana’s low carbon development strategy. The role of Guyana and Norway’s innovative REDD+ partnership. Roving Ambassador to the Three Basins Initiative. May 2013.
18. Annex 18 – Facilitating ambitious partnerships: An overview of South-South cooperation. Clinton Climate Initiative. April 2013.
19. Annex 19 – Halting and reversing forest loss at jurisdictional scale. Using interim climate finance to incentivise the private sector. Roving Ambassador to the Three Basins Initiative. June 2013.
20. Annex 20 – Readiness for REDD+: Requirements and expectations for ambitious partnerships. Clinton Climate Initiative. April 2013.

**Phase II documentation**

21. Joint statement of Colombia, the United Kingdom, Germany and Norway on reducing emissions from deforestation in the Colombian Amazon.
22. Benefit Sharing from REDD+: Where does the money go and who benefits from it? Clinton Climate Initiative. April 2013.
23. Rediscovering Ambition on Forests. Maintaining one of the World's greatest assets. Roving Ambassador for the Three Basins Initiative. President Bharrat Jagdeo. March 2013.
24. Forest Landscape Restoration Opportunity. Information note. May 2013
25. Roving Ambassador Final Financial Report Letter and Report. December 2013.
26. Roving Ambassador for the Three Basins Grant Phase II Final Report. December 2013

**Phase I documentation**

27. Roving Ambassador for the Three Basins Grant. Phase I. Final Report to Norway. June 2012.

**Other documents**

28. Sarah Stachowiak 2013. PATHWAYS TO CHANGE: 10 Theories to Inform Advocacy and Policy Change Efforts. ORS Impact
29. Scope of Work for "Accelerating Action on REDD+ through Forest Landscape Restoration (Accelerating Action)" sub-grant. IUCN and WRI

**Note:** Numbered references are referred to in the main text

## Annex III: Terms of Reference for the review

**Duration:** 20 days during the period 1 September – 31 October 2016

**Direct reporting line:** Julien Colomer, Monitoring and Learning Officer, Global Forests and Climate Change Programme

### **1. Objective**

To review project outcomes to better understand and communicate the learning, and contribution to change, from the Phase 3 of the Roving Ambassador for the Three Basins Project (1 January 2014 – 31 December 2015), financed by the Norwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment.

### **2. Background**

IUCN oversaw implementation of Phase 3 of Roving Ambassador for the Three Basins Project (1 January 2014 – 31 December 2015). The overall goals of the project were to:

1. Advance the global policy agenda around forests and inclusive low carbon development in forest countries,
2. Catalyse and support the establishment of ambitious interim REDD+ partnerships between Annex 1 and Three Basin country governments,
3. Support broad-based south-south learning and information sharing, and collaboration across the countries of the Three Basins, as well as better collaboration between forest countries, Annex 1 countries and international organisations.

The project was implemented in three phases:

- Phase I: An initiating phase in the run up to Rio+20 (March – June 2012),
- Phase II: A launch phase (July 2012 – September 2013)
- Phase III: A scaling phase (September 2013 [actually 1 Jan 2014] - December 2015).

Under Phase 3, work focused on two over-arching objectives:

1. Continue to support the shaping of the international policy agenda around forests and inclusive low carbon development in forest countries, in support of the UNFCCC process up to COP 21.
2. Support specific ambitious partnerships, based on a pipeline of demand from forest countries.  
2A - Facilitate the advance of Colombia's ambitious partnership.  
2B - Facilitating the assessment of Colombia's national/subnational restoration potential.  
2C - Support up to three other ambitious partnerships for jurisdiction-wide action.

### **3. Main purpose of the study**

With a focus on Phase 3 of the project, but not excluding earlier phases managed by the Clinton Climate Initiative, the consultant will undertake a desk-based review of available project and related documents, supplemented by at least 5 key global (including project staff from the three implementing institutions) and 3-4 national informant interviews. The evaluation should specifically address the project's relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability (according to agreed DAC criteria for evaluating development

assistance). The evaluation report should also describe and assess the intervention logic or theory, including underlying assumptions and factors affecting the success of the intervention.

The evaluation should also at least answer the following questions:

- What main changes did the project contribute to at global and national scales?
- Are those changes being sustained?
- How did the project contribute to those changes?
- What were the main enabling and constraining factors that helped or hindered contribution to change?
- What key lessons should Norway Ministry of Climate and Environment and other partners be aware of?

Among the informants, both government officials from the key countries (Colombia, Peru, Norway) and representatives from the Norwegian Embassy in Colombia should be included. The findings will be made available to IUCN in a 20 page report, using visual aids such as timelines as appropriate to clearly convey key messages. The main target audiences for the report are Norway Ministry of Climate and Environment and IUCN. The report will be made public.

#### **4. Approach**

The consultant will draw from appropriate methods, such as Collaborative Outcome Reporting, Episode Study, Performance Story etc to select an appropriate approach for the consultancy. This will be communicated to and agreed by IUCN.

#### **5. Deliverables**

The consultant will deliver a 20 page report, using available secondary information (project reports, related web-based information) and primary data (at least 5 key informant interviews) to provide a evidence-based narrative against the key objective. Visual aids such as timelines will be used as appropriate to clearly convey key messages.

#### **6. Timeline and total working days**

- 2 page summary presenting the approach, timeline and outline of main document (2 days)
- Document review (5 days)
- Key informant interviews (5 days)
- Synthesis and report development (5 days)
- IUCN review of draft report
- Report finalisation (3 days)

Total working days: 20 days during the period 1 September – 31 October 2016.

1. The two-page summary approach, timeline and outline no later than 8<sup>th</sup> September 2016.
2. A draft report will be delivered to IUCN for review not later than 21 October 2016.
3. The final report will be delivered to IUCN no later than 31 October 2016.

## Annex IV: The “Policy Window” theory of change<sup>5</sup>

The Policy Windows theory is John Kingdon’s classic theory of agenda-setting attempts to clarify why some issues get attention in the policy process and others do not. He identified three “streams” related to the policy system:

1. *Problems*: The way social conditions become defined as “a problem” to policy makers, including the problem’s attributes, its status, the degree of social consciousness of the issue, and whether the problem is perceived as solvable with clear alternatives.
2. *Policies*: The ideas generated to address problems.
3. *Politics*: Political factors, including the “national mood” (e.g., appetite for “big government”), campaigns by interest groups and advocates, and changes in elected officials.

According to this theory, to increase the likelihood that an issue will receive serious attention or be placed on the policy agenda, at least two of the streams need to converge at critical moments or “policy windows.” Policy windows are windows of opportunity that arise when there is the possibility for policy change.

### *Underlying Assumptions*

- Policy streams operate independently.
- Advocates can couple policy streams when a policy window opens. For example, advocates can attach their solutions to a problem that has gained prominence on the agenda (even if its rise was independent of their efforts).
- Success is most likely when all three components (problems, policies, and politics) come together during a policy window.
- Policy windows can be predictable (e.g., elections, budget cycles) and unpredictable (e.g., a dramatic event or crisis, such as a plane crash or hurricane). Policy windows also can be created.
- The way a problem is defined makes a difference as to whether and where the problem is placed on the agenda. Problem definition also has a value or emotional component; values and beliefs guide decisions about which conditions are perceived as problems.
- Often there are many competing ideas on how to address problems. To receive serious consideration, policy options need to be seen as technically feasible and consistent with policy maker and public values.
- To effectively recognize and take advantage of open policy windows, advocates must possess knowledge, time, relationships, and good reputations.

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
<sup>5</sup> Sarah Stachowiak 2013. PATHWAYS TO CHANGE: 10 Theories to Inform Advocacy and Policy Change Efforts. ORS Impact

### Application to Advocacy

Promising strategies include:

- impacting problem definition (i.e., framing the issue, monitoring indicators that assess the existence and magnitude of issues, initiating special studies of an issue, promoting constituent feedback);
- developing policy options (e.g., through research, publications, and the like), and;
- influencing the political climate (e.g., coalition building, demonstrations, and media advocacy).

Advocates and organizations need adequate capacity to create and/or recognize policy windows and then respond appropriately.



## Annex V: The “Diffusion” theory of change<sup>6</sup>

Everett M. Roger’s Diffusion of Innovations, or Diffusion theory, refers to the process by which a change agent (e.g., individual, informal group, or organization) models or communicates an innovation. The innovation can be as diverse as a product, practice, program, policy, or idea. Over time, the innovation may move onward to certain types or categories of adopters: early adopters, the early majority, the late majority, and laggards. Should the innovation reach a critical mass, it either will be adopted or rejected by members of the social system. An innovation is more likely to be adopted if it is relatively easy to comprehend; perceived as better than the idea it supersedes; and/or is compatible with the values, beliefs, and needs of the potential adopters. The degree to which the innovation, or results of the innovation, is visible and communicated to others, can influence the rate of adoption. When new ideas are invented, diffused, and adopted or rejected, social change can occur.

### *Underlying Assumptions*

- Diffusion includes both the planned and spontaneous spread of new ideas.
- Newness means that some degree of uncertainty is involved in diffusion. However, an idea can feel familiar or normative if it is compatible with the potential adopter’s existing values and belief system.
- Potential adopters’ perceptions of the change agent(s) or opinion leader(s) affect their willingness to adopt a new idea. Thus, if the innovator is an outsider to the social system, there may be greater skepticism or opposition to the innovation.
- It should not be assumed that the diffusion and adoption of all innovations is necessarily desirable for a social system.

### *Application to Advocacy*

- Policy and law can force individuals to adopt an innovation. However, individuals seem more open to the innovation or persuadable when the relative advantages of adoption are communicated and/or made visible by peers or media.
- Organizations may appoint a champion or charismatic individual who throws his or her weight behind an innovation and the diffusion process.
- Promising strategies include research, policy solution development, dissemination activities, champion development, and communications.

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<sup>6</sup> Sarah Stachowiak 2013. PATHWAYS TO CHANGE: 10 Theories to Inform Advocacy and Policy Change Efforts. ORS Impact

